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Institutionally blind? Executive Summary 
 
Institutionally blind? examines whether some of the major international institutions covering the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) are currently meeting their human rights commitments. The publication shows how the independence 
and integrity of institutions defending human rights in the region are under attack from outside and within, 
sometimes buckling under the pressure. 
 
The publication highlights the need to improve transparency and public understanding around how delegations to 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) 
operate, looking at the reasons why politicians overlook human rights concerns, from ideology to personal gain. It 
looks at ways make the delegations more attractive to ambitious politicians and better integrate their work into 
policy-making. It also notes how the CIS Parliamentary Assembly imitates the practices of PACE and the OSCE PA, 
while acting as rubber stamp for their regimes and giving credence to flawed elections.  
 
The independence and effectiveness of outspoken human rights bodies such as the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media are under threat by 
budget freezes and attempts to put their work under the political supervision of the OSCE’s consensus driven 
intergovernmental bodies. ODIHR’s long-term detailed work in election observations is sometimes undermined by 
short-term delegations from other bodies such as PACE or the OSCE PA who are less critical of electoral 
impropriety. Across the region, in both democracies and authoritarian states, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is under political attack for its intrusion into domestic law, while its continuing case backlog means 
significant delays for those desperately seeking justice.  
 
Institutionally blind? assesses the shift in EU policy away from ‘values promotion’ towards a more traditional focus 
on economic opportunities and regional security. However, it shows that for the most part the European 
Parliament (EP) has pushed to keep human rights on the agenda and it has a key role to play in the ratification of 
EU Agreements that must not be ignored.  
 
The publication shows how other institutions such as INTERPOL and EITI have taken positive steps responding to 
human rights concerns in the FSU. It discusses the challenges development banks face in the FSU and how their 
tools, such as the Doing Business report can be misused. 
 
Institutionally blind? examines these problems in the context of the economic and strategic pressures facing the 
countries and institutions of Europe and the FSU. While the situation may be tough, the current economic 
problems in the FSU may provide new opportunities. Challenging times are no excuse for being institutionally blind.  
 
The publication makes a number of key recommendations: 
 
To the EU and European Political Groups  
 The EU must ensure that revisions to the operation of the Eastern Partnership policy and Central Asia 
strategy do not significantly downgrade the importance of human rights;  
 The EEAS and Commission should ensure that the revised progress report structure does not stop the EU 
reporting on human rights and governance issues;  
 Other EU institutions, the European Parliament’s own delegations and member states should reflect the 
positions passed by the EP in their interactions with states in the FSU. The EP should be encouraged to 
stand by its objections to ratifying agreements with countries that have failed to meet agreed human 
rights objectives, such as in the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; 
 International political groups must pay more attention to human rights abuses amongst their memberships 
and show consistency in their approach to such abuses.  
 
To national parliaments and NGOs  
 National Parliaments should raise the profile and standing of the delegations they send to international 
Parliamentary Assemblies and improve the transparency around the work that they do there, such as 
recording votes on national websites;  
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 NGOs, and parliamentary ethics bodies, must continue to increase scrutiny of financial relationships 
between Parliamentarians and groups aligned to FSU governments; 
 European nations, most notably the UK, need to show a greater understanding of the political impact that 
their domestic criticisms of international institutions, such as the ECtHR, can have on the debate in FSU 
countries.  
 
To the Council of Europe and its members 
 The ECtHR needs to increase its capacity in order to further reduce its case backlog and must be properly 
resourced by member states to do so;  
 PACE needs to improve its organisational transparency, particularly when it comes to difficult human rights 
debates, and address its role in election observation so that it does not undermine the work of longer-term 
observers such as the OSCE/ODIHR. 
 
To the OSCE and its participating States 
 The OSCE must defend the role of ODIHR in providing long-term election observation, ensuring it remains 
an assessment mechanism judging countries election practices;  
 OSCE participating States should strongly consider ending the OSCE budget freeze to enable it to respond 
to the increasing demands on is resources; 
 Human rights sympathetic participating States must help ensure the independence of ODIHR and the 
Representative on Freedom of Media from the consensus mechanisms that operate elsewhere in the 
OSCE. They should explore opportunities to introduce majority voting in the Permanent Council and other 
bodies to reduce political gridlock and work to improve the transparency of decision-making in such 
meetings;  
 Participating states should more strongly oppose the downgrading of field offices.  
 
To the economic institutions  
 Regional and global development banks need to provide clearer incentives for lending that reward 
democratic development and governance reform; this is particularly true for the EBRD which formally 
retains such a mandate; 
 The EITI should look at ways to ensure and maintain the independence of the NGO’s participating in its 
structures and improve central oversight of governance problems.  
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Introduction: Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in  
the former Soviet Union 
Adam Hug1 
 
Are institutions up to the task? This is perhaps the defining question of modern politics and government. At the 
time of writing, in early 2016, the existing international institutional architecture covering Europe and the former 
Soviet Union finds itself under political attack as national governments increasingly challenge the right of 
international institutions to influence or challenge domestic policy, particularly when it comes to the area of 
human rights and rule of law. This mirrors but amplifies the declining trust citizens feel towards institutions, both 
public and private, at all levels including national politics. Although sometimes national politicians may use 
international bodies as convenient distractions from their own challenges, the distance between such organisations 
and their often technocratic remit can create challenges in building public understanding about their activities. 
Such a distance can reduce the level of importance people and politicians feel towards such institutions. While 
international human rights bodies and other institutions can be portrayed, often inaccurately, as an unnecessary 
annoyance by the Western media, in areas where governance and rule of law are weak and human rights abuses 
regularly occur these institutions can play a vital role in providing protection and redress when governments fail to 
act or are themselves the cause of the problem. The purpose of this publication is to assess whether the 
international political and economic institutions that cover or influence the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
are currently up to the task of meeting their responsibilities in responding to human rights and governance abuses 
in the region. If they are not, it then asks what steps can be taken to address this.  
 
Specific institutional challenges 
 
The EU 
At the time of writing the European Union is beset by challenges from stuttering economies and a still fragile euro, 
the strategic impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the security challenges fuelled by the continuing conflict in 
Syria - the latter a major contributor to the stresses and strains of the migrant crisis which has stretched European 
solidarity and the principles of free movement to breaking point. The British are questioning their continued 
participation in this institution, with a referendum on UK membership due potentially as early as June 2016. Its 
previously vaunted success in encouraging and underpinning democracy and human rights amongst its member 
states is itself coming under renewed scrutiny due to the deteriorating political conditions in countries such as 
Hungary and Poland. These stresses and strains, combined with limited human rights success in recent years, is 
contributing to steady downgrading of the importance of promoting its ‘values agenda’ - the focus on promoting 
democracy, good governance and human rights - in its diplomatic and institutional engagement with the countries 
of the former Soviet Union. 
 
Unlike some of the other institutions examined in this publication most of the countries of the former Soviet Union 
are not full members of the EU (with the notable exceptions of the Baltic states); however it operates a number of 
projects that seek to influence behaviour and deepen ties between it and the states of the region. The most high 
profile of these is the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) project, part of its wider European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) which focuses on deepening relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. 
However the limitations of the Eastern Partnership were already becoming apparent by the time then-President 
Yanukovych withdrew from negotiations on the creation of an Association and a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, lighting the sparks that would set off the crisis in 
Ukraine.2 The Eastern Partnership’s troubled development leaves real challenges about how to deal with the 
countries who have rejected the EU's offers of an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA). Those rejecting this offer just so happen to have the three most challenging human rights 
environments in the Eastern Partnership region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. This is not Europe’s only 
challenge in the wider region, as events in Ukraine understandably continue to overshadow EU-Russia relations and 
the EU has increasingly been squeezed down the pecking order of influence in Central Asia, particularly since the 
                                                             
1
 Adam Hug has served as Policy Director at the Foreign Policy Centre since June 2008. He leads the organisation’s research on Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle 
East and human rights. 
2
 For a more detailed analysis of the future of EU Eastern Partnership Adam Hug (ed.) Trouble in the Neighbourhood? The future of the EU's Eastern Partnership, FPC, 
February 2015, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/trouble-in-the-neighbourhood  
7 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rise of China as the main emerging economic and political counterweight to 
Russia in the region.  
 
As Dr. Hrant Kostanyan’s essay in this collection shows, following the recent review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the newly revised Eastern Partnership process takes a noticeably more ‘realist’ approach to 
the region, prioritising stability and economic ties over political reform and human rights.3 He quotes the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini as describing the priorities for 
neighbourhood policy as now being “First, focus on economic development and job creation; second, cooperation 
on energy; third, security; fourth, migration; fifth, neighbours of the neighbours.”4 This move mirrors a similar 
stability-first shift in the EU’s approach to Central Asia.5 The recognition of the problems faced by the EU’s 
traditional ‘more for more’ approach in countries that have been less interested in the incentives on offer, such as 
Azerbaijan, seems to be matched with a resignation that it would struggle to achieve support for a ‘less for less’ 
approach from EU member states and that it might undermine other priorities. 
 
A seemingly minor proposed procedural change means that the EU will no longer provide its traditional annual 
progress reports for countries not proceeding towards an AA &DCFTA. If this translates in practice to the EU no 
longer commenting on areas where the partner country is not complying with the bilateral agreement made 
between the EU and that country, this may potentially remove an important tool for monitoring of governance 
reform and progress on human rights issues.6 Greater differentiation - that is, a more individual shaping of 
agreements to focus on what partners want - along with a prioritisation of economic and security issues adds to the 
risk that human rights and governance standards will be put to one side. Unsurprisingly, formal EU statements on 
political developments remain hamstrung by the need for unanimity in the Foreign Affairs Council; something that 
continues to restrict the EU’s ability to respond to emerging human rights challenges in the FSU in its official 
statements, actions, and its sometimes lowest common denominator press releases about human rights abuses 
increasingly treated with disdain by beleaguered human rights defenders.  
 
This partial retreat from the values-agenda on behalf of the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) and European 
Commission is not necessarily reflected in the attitudes of its other major decision-making body, the European 
Parliament (EP). Perhaps more so than its sister assemblies discussed below, the EP can be more consistently  vocal 
on some human rights issues in the region; however as Tika Tsertsvadze sets out in her contribution in this 
publication, the EP’s declarative motions on these issues sometimes have relatively little impact on decision-
making by the EEAS, Commission and member states. The Parliament itself needs to do more to ensure that its 
own delegations do not undermine the content of these resolutions by their actions in-country, with the tendency 
for regime-sympathetic politicians to play leading roles in these groupings. Compliance with these resolutions 
needs to be more firmly factored into the Parliament’s decisions around delegation composition and leadership, 
rather than be used as a pawn in wider political games. An egregious example of which was shown when 
longstanding critic of human rights promotion Iveta Grigule7 was allowed to take the chair of the Central Asia 
delegation on the basis that she was willing to leave the UKIP-led Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group, 
thereby removing its status as an official Parliamentary Group.8  
 
However, the EP can play a decisive role over the future of agreements where its ratification is required in order for 
implementation to occur. In 2015 the EP successfully delayed the approval of the EU-Uzbekistan textile protocol 
that would reduce European tariffs on Uzbek cotton products, until the International Labour Organisation sees 
further progress in tackling the issue of forced labour; while the EU-Turkmenistan Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement has languished unimplemented for 15 years due to parliamentary concerns over human rights. 2016 is 
                                                             
3
 European Commission, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, November 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-
communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf    
4
 EEAS, ENP Review: stronger partnerships for a stronger neighbourhood, press release, 17 November 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/181115_enp_review_en.htm  
5
 Ann-Sophie Gast, A Shift in the EU Strategy for Central Asia, Carnegie Moscow Centre, April 2014, 
 http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=55483    
6
 European Commission, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 18 November 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/pdf/key-
documents/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf  
7
 Iveta Grigule, The Case for Central Asia as the European Partner, EP Today,  January 2016,  http://eptoday.com/the-case-for-central-asia-as-the-european-partner/  
8
 EFDD, Political blackmail by federalists leads to MEP resignation and collapse of Eurosceptic group in European Parliament, October 2014, 
http://www.efdgroup.eu/newsroom/press-releases/item/political-blackmail-by-federalists-leads-to-mep-resignation-and-collapse-of-eurosceptic-group-in-european-
parliament  
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likely to see an even bigger and more fraught battle over the future of the EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement. The agreement, signed in December 2015, will require ratification by the European 
Parliament, whose existing concerns around human rights standards previously set out in resolutions have not 
been met.9 However, particularly when compared to discussions around Uzbekistan, the EP will come under 
considerable pressure to ratify given the economic interests involved.10 The EP’s recent strong focus on human 
rights abuses in Azerbaijan also should be appropriately factored into EEAS decision-making around whether to 
agree a ‘Strategic Partnership’ agreement with Azerbaijan outside the traditional format of the Eastern Partnership 
process, given the risk that the Parliament might refuse to ratify such a deal.   
 
The Council of Europe and the OSCE 
The Council of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE are bodies dedicated to bringing the states of Europe and the former 
Soviet Union together to promote human rights and security. Traditionally, in Western Europe the CoE and OSCE 
have a relatively low profile, with limited public understanding of their role and function. The former is routinely 
confused and conflated with the European Union.11 However, in the UK at least, there has been increasing scrutiny 
of the Council of Europe’s more controversial decision-making, and in particular, the role of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) - the CoE’s most prominent institution. While Britain continues to flirt with downgrading the 
influence of ECtHR rulings in its legal system, in part taking advantage of the political cover the UK has provided, 
Russia has followed through on similar threats by allowing the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to 
overturn ECtHR judgments it deems unconstitutional.12 Russia’s voting rights at the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) had already been suspended over the Ukraine crisis; taken together this raises further 
questions over its long-term future in the CoE. Azerbaijan’s future in the CoE is difficult to predict as its behaviour 
at PACE has been the source of much contestation between its supporters and critics, as outlined below and in 
Rebecca Vincent’s contribution. Belarus, it should be noted, never successfully concluded its membership 
application, whilst the states of Central Asia fall beyond the CoE’s remit. Following a number of rounds of 
organisational reform, the ECtHR is reducing its backlog of cases, but longstanding delays, such as over cases 
relating to the 2005 election in Azerbaijan, are acting to undermine support for the ECtHR amongst some human 
rights defenders from the region.  
 
Beyond the ECtHR and PACE, the CoE does play host to two particularly important institutions for the promotion of 
human rights in the region. Firstly, the Venice Commission (the European Commission for Democracy through Law) 
provides an unparalleled range of independent legal expertise to assist CoE member states in the development of 
legislation. However the details of its recommendations are often overlooked by states which are sometimes more 
keen to announce that they have discussed proposed laws with the Venice Commission than they are to listen to 
what the Commission has to say and implement its recommendations. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for 
Human Rights, currently Nils Muižnieks, is also a position that often challenges human rights abuses in member 
countries and calls for the protection of local human rights defenders.  
 
The OSCE, which includes the countries of both Central Asia and North America, has an even lower profile in 
Western political debate. While predominantly a regional security organisation, its definition of security has a 
‘human dimension’ relating to human rights and functioning democratic institutions that are deemed essential for 
its concept of lasting security. As a result, the OSCE provides a home for some of the region’s most effective 
institutions for monitoring human rights performance: the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) perhaps best known for providing the most detailed and reliable official election observations in the region 
through the posting of experienced long-term observers, and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
currently Dunja Mijatović, who plays an active role in championing media freedom and the protection of journalists 
in the region.13 Given the budgetary pressures on the OSCE outlined by Dr. Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz and Anna 
Chernova, the election section work is being squeezed, particularly relating to countries where governments see 
                                                             
9
 EEAS Press Release, EU and Kazakhstan sign Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, December 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151221_02_en.htm    
10
 Mihra Rittmann, Will the EU Be Called to Task on Kazakhstan?, Human Rights Watch, January 2016,  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/04/will-eu-be-called-task-kazakhstan  
11
 A situation not helped by the EU’s decision to call its head of state and ministerial bodies the European Council and the Council of the European Union. 
12
 DW, Russia crafts loophole around European Court of Human Rights, December 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/russia-crafts-loophole-around-european-court-of-human-
rights/a-18918407 The ECtHR’s judgement requiring Russia to pay Yukos shareholders €1.9 billion may also have helped it come to this decision.  
13
 A further important institution, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities remit spans both security and human dimension but in part due to space restrictions 
its work is not addressed in this publication. 
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this work as problematic, while ODIHR in general remains under pressure with the Russians particularly keen to 
defund its work.  
 
Governments in a number of former Soviet countries have sought to downgrade the size and remit of country 
offices of the OSCE, and in some cases suspend its operations entirely. This has seen Azerbaijan first downgrading 
the OSCE office in Baku to a ‘project coordinator’ in January 2014, before ordering it to close entirely in the 
summer of 2015.14 Belarus similarly terminated the mandate of the OSCE office in late 2010, leading to its closure 
in March 2011.15 Georgia too closed its OSCE office in 2008 due to Russian involvement in the organisation; 
however this also meant that the organisation lacked a presence on the ground as the human rights situation in the 
country deteriorated in the later years of the Saakashvili Presidency. The Georgia office has yet to be reopened. 
Across the rest of the region a patchwork of different office formats includes centres, offices, missions and project 
coordinators of varying size and resource levels.16  
 
Both the Parliamentarians involved in the respective OSCE and CoE assemblies and the national governments 
working with these institutions should pay greater heed to the findings of these important expert bodies when 
developing their policies within the CoE and OSCE, at a bilateral level with countries of the former Soviet Union, 
and in the development of EU policies. However, rather than being supported, this expert work is sadly often 
undermined by politicians operating to different agendas. 
 
Too much Caviar? 
In 2012 the German think tank the European Stability Initiative (ESI) produced an influential report entitled Caviar 
Diplomacy: How Azerbaijan Silenced the Council of Europe. The issues it raised are not unique to Azerbaijan or 
indeed PACE, although both the country and the institution provide some of the best examples human rights 
concerns being overlooked by Parliamentarians. The ESI report drew particular attention to the issues around 
lavish gift giving, and subsequent supportive behaviour amongst politicians active at PACE. This may very well be 
part of the story, but as ESI also note there are other factors at play here. So why do some Parliamentarians 
seemingly overlook human rights abuses and election violations in their work? 
   
 Lack of knowledge: Parliamentarians, for the most part, are not initially experts on the countries whose 
issues they may be asked to engage with as part of their duties with PACE, the OSCE PA or other 
institutions. Many European Parliamentary systems tend to promote generalist knowledge rather than the 
development of specialisms. The ability of Parliamentarians to spend time on the ground in a particular 
country will often be dependent on an external group taking them there, and for the most part the 
organisations offering to provide free travel to a country are usually in some way affiliated with the current 
governments or ruling elites within those countries. Given the relative lack of information about these 
countries being provided directly to Parliamentarians or in the Western media, proactive engagement by 
regime-aligned pressure groups and specifically created think tanks17 can have a significant impact on 
shaping Parliamentarians’ understanding of the region. Furthermore this lack of prior knowledge may lead 
to an increased willingness to see allegations of human rights abuse as literally that - allegations yet to be 
proven - giving the benefit of the doubt more freely to governments in the former Soviet Union than 
maybe merited.  
 
 Belief in constructive engagement and their powers of persuasion: This approach fits closely to the idea 
of the states of the FSU being in the process of transition, that they are ‘emerging democracies’ looking for 
guidance. The belief, or at least hope, that FSU parliamentary delegations share a willingness to reform 
and learn from dialogue processes, inter-parliamentary work ultimately leading to changes in behaviour 
through the process of socialisation.18 This approach has fundamental limits where the parliamentarians 
                                                             
14
 OSCE, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Baku discontinues its operations in Azerbaijan, July 2015, 
 http://www.osce.org/secretariat/170146  
15
 OSCE, As OSCE Office in Minsk closes, OSCE Chairperson expresses regrets, says efforts to enable OSCE work in Belarus continue, March 2011, 
http://www.osce.org/cio/76282  
16
 OSCE, Where were are, http://www.osce.org/where  
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 Kazakhstan has proved adept at such work, with for example the creation of the Eurasian Council on Foreign Affairs. http://www.eurasiancouncilforeignaffairs.eu/ 
18
 The process of socialisation is believed to begin with ‘strategic calculation’- the response to specific incentives and penalties, followed by ‘role playing’ where behaviour is 
influenced by group norms but underlying positions do not change, followed finally by ‘normative suasion’ where such dialogue  can fundamentally shift behaviour amongst 
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from the FSU rely on fundamentally undemocratic means of obtaining and maintaining political office, 
thereby creating a potentially insurmountable structural barrier to significant behaviour change. 
 
 Solidarity between Parliamentarians: For parliamentarians there can be a tendency to over-identify with 
the political challenges, such as for example press intrusion, facing fellow lawmakers in very different 
political environments, particularly when the interlocutor comes from the ruling party in an authoritarian 
or semi-authoritarian state.19 A simple desire to be polite and diplomatic in the dialogue process can 
sometimes inhibit the ability to ask probing questions, or enter difficult areas of debate. 
 
 Solidarity between parties: The role of international political alliances can play an important part in the 
internal horse-trading around the allocation of offices within different Parliamentary Assemblies. However 
these ties can run deeper as part of longer-term partnerships between parties of East and West. The role 
played by the European People’s Party (EPP)20 in the Eastern Partnership region has become an increasing 
cause for concern amongst human rights activists. Such concerns include the EPP’s inconsistent approach 
to human rights in Georgia, where it was inclined to overlook the excesses of its member party the United 
National Movement (UNM) when it was in power. However the EPP has become increasingly vocal about 
human rights concerns now that the UNM is in opposition and a number of its leaders are facing criminal 
charges, ostensibly for crimes committed whilst it was in government. Armenia’s ruling Republican Party 
has similarly benefited from a sympathetic political ear provided by its EPP political family, while the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM) led by Vlad Filat, the former Moldovan Prime Minister 
currently facing trial for corruption, had previously received strong support from the EPP.21 The EPP is not 
alone however, with the political groupings in the Council of Europe bringing together strange bedfellows 
in other political families. For example the European Democrats group brings together Britain’s 
Conservative Party, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Azerbaijan’s ruling New 
Azerbaijan Party (YAP) and some of the Armenian ruling elite parties; while the Socialist Group contains 
both the UK Labour Party and many continental social democrats but also Armenia’s nationalist Dashnak 
party, and previously included parts of the extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and 
Ukraine’s Party of the Regions (the party of ex-President Yanukovych).  
 
 Political ‘Realism’22: As touched on with the shift in current EU policy, the desire to obtain the greatest 
advantage for a Western member state or Europe in general, can play an important role in muting 
potential criticism of human rights abuse. Whether it is a desire to prioritise access to economic 
opportunities in authoritarian countries, or a worldview that sees a link between political stability and firm 
but not always fair governance, both can lead to uncritical political engagement. Proponents of such a 
position would be particularly mindful of the limited scope for European and Eurasian institutions to bring 
about radical change in the behaviour of post-Soviet partners, at least in the short term, and therefore 
would be more critical of efforts to exert political pressure over issues of human rights; lest it undermine 
progress towards other economic, energy and security goals.  
 
 Anti-imperialism: Particularly common on both the radical left and radical right is a view that it is morally 
wrong and often hypocritical to challenge human rights abuses in the less developed political cultures of 
the former Soviet Union. While this view may overlook or down play the importance or appropriateness of 
political agreements containing human rights commitments that these countries have entered into, or 
indeed the entire role of the Council of Europe, it rightly draws attention to the need to ensure that 
Western Parliamentarians and institutions meet their own commitments and do not seek to undermine 
the influence of such scrutiny bodies in their own countries. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
partner politicians. For more see Hrant Kostanyan & Bruno Vandecasteele, The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly: The European Parliament as a Socializer of its Counterparts 
in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood? May 2013, https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/edp_5_2013_-_kostanyan_vandecasteele.pdf 
19
 Most Parliamentarians are of course cognisant of the types of politician they are dealing with.   
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11 
 Constituency interest or the lack thereof: The higher the number of members of a particular diaspora in a 
particular politician’s constituency, the more likely the politician is to engage in international political 
activity related to that diaspora’s country of origin. Perceptions of such influence have traditionally 
included that of the Armenian diaspora over French engagement in both the Council of Europe and OSCE 
for example, and US engagement in the OSCE. Constituency interest can also be economic in nature, with 
representatives of constituencies containing energy industry firms often taking a keener interest in the 
energy-producing states of the former Soviet Union. Both of these characteristics also apply to All Party 
Groups and similar ‘friendship groups’ in national parliaments, where administrative and agenda-shaping 
functions are often fulfilled by Embassies or pro-government groups, further increasing the likelihood of 
participation by regime-sympathetic western parliamentarians in such activities. As touched on below, in 
Parliamentary systems without direct constituency representation or where seats are considered to be 
‘safe’, there may be a potentially lower level of scrutiny of a parliamentarian’s activities in these 
international forums by domestic political observers.  
 
 ‘Caviar flavoured’ diplomacy: There needs to perhaps be another category - ‘caviar flavoured’ - to describe 
behaviour that may be seen as inappropriate or unethical but is not immediately transactional in nature. 
Most notably this would include politicians choosing to limit their criticism of particular countries’ human 
rights performance with the hope of building contact networks that could be used as part of future 
business activity once the politician has left public life, or where rules allow Parliamentarians to earn 
external sources of income. This is of particular relevance in relation to energy-producing states.  
 
 Gift giving and direct financial support: The ‘Caviar diplomacy’. The ESI report specifically noted claims of 
gifts of caviar being given to supporters of Azerbaijan within PACE, alongside other inducements such as 
carpets and holidays. Related techniques include payments made for the Parliamentarian providing 
advisory services to pro-government groups, and such groups providing assistance with the running of 
parliamentary offices, including secondment of staff. None of this behaviour is necessarily illegal, provided 
gifts and business arrangements are appropriately declared; however there is a strong whiff of ethically 
inappropriate activity when recipients of such largess subsequently stick very close to the official talking 
points of the government in question. The perception amongst human rights activists that this mechanism 
is used particularly by petro-states, notably in the context of the Council of Europe by Azerbaijan as 
documented by ESI and touched on in this publication by Rebecca Vincent.23 However it is not alone; for 
example Russia stands accused of providing financial assistance to nationalist parties across the EU, 
including €9 million in loans from a Kremlin-aligned bank to France’s Front National.24  
 
In the UK Parliament, and those of some other member states, there is a fundamental structural problem in that 
participation in the work of the Council of Europe and OSCE is not seen as conducive to political advancement, and 
being seen to spend time abroad not directly servicing the needs of constituents can carry a degree of political 
risk.25 A significant proportion of the delegations can therefore be filled both by politicians whose political careers 
are drawing to a close (for example former ministers) and those unlikely to be asked to take on the demands of 
high office during their time in public life. In the case of the UK delegations there is also a significant presence from 
the House of Lords, who can often provide greater expertise but lack a degree of democratic accountability. One 
senior political advisor described the UK parliamentary perception of the work of the delegations as being about 
“jollies” and “junkets” an opportunity for international travel and fine dining but with little meaningful output.26 
While this may well be unfair given the diligent work of many parliamentarians within these institutions, it is also 
true that despite the expertise gained, delegation members are unlikely to be the first port of call for advice for 
their political parties or the Government on issues relating to the post-Soviet space unless their reputation for 
regional knowledge is obtained from another source. National parliaments need to do more to improve the 
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 EU Observer, Farage and Le Pen unite on Russia report, June 2015, https://euobserver.com/political/129071. 
25
 Politicians from marginal seats, at least those who hope to hold onto them, find it particularly difficult to be able to just ify and find time for participation in such activities.  
26
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attractiveness of the delegations as a form of parliamentary activity and increase transparency around what the 
delegations do. More needs to be done to inform their fellow parliamentarians about the work of the delegations 
and what can be achieved through participation, particularly as increased competition for places could potentially 
help improve the quality of the delegation’s performance and act as a disincentive to ‘try the caviar’. In the UK for 
example, this could be done with a view to encouraging delegation membership to be seen as a positive factor 
when voting for membership of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and encouraging greater formal dialogue 
between the delegations, Select Committees and Ministers. National Parliaments can do more to facilitate public 
transparency by recording the plenary votes of delegation members on their own parliamentary websites.  
 
Money is blind? 
The post-Soviet region contains a wide array of economic conditions, from struggling economies with a heavy 
reliance on remittances (mostly from Russia) such as Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, to the petro-states with 
significant opportunities for clientelism such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Russia. Both have been 
impacted significantly by the current regional economic contraction driven by the collapse in the oil price and the 
impact of economic sanctions on Russia. Over the coming months this may lead to greater opportunities for the 
international community to exert some leverage to encourage greater transparency and tackle corruption. For 
example, that the IMF would be in talks with Azerbaijan about the provision of a $4 billion short-term loan would 
not have been in many analysts’ predictions for that country a few years back. However prior to this recent crisis, 
the rising influence of both private lending and competition from Asian regional banks such as the Asian 
Development Bank (and perceptions of future influence of the upcoming Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) led 
to a sense of the declining influence of the European-based official lenders, such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the EIB, along with the Bretton Woods Institutions. In this 
publication, Charles Hecker argues that the World Bank is mindful of the governance concerns in the region but 
considers that the longer such institutions remain engaged, the greater they believe their ability to influence 
decision-making will be. When financing both public and private sector projects, lending to countries economically 
dominated by oligarchic elites always carries the risk that such funding will help entrench existing power structures 
- a challenge that is far from easy for financial institutions to avoid if they seek to do business in such 
environments.  
 
The World Bank’s Doing Business Report is a tool that has been of increasing interest to the governments of the 
FSU. It has been used by regimes in the region to counter accusations of poor governance standards, by being able 
to use the report findings as a proxy indicator of institutional reform. The report has some initially surprising 
results. For example, the oligarch-dominated economy of Armenia (35th) is ranked above Belgium (43rd), as is 
Kazakhstan (41st) - a country where the ruling family’s economic interests penetrate key industries. Russia (51st) 
with its Kafkaesque official bureaucracy and predatory regime ranks 10 places above Luxembourg (61st).27 As 
touched on by Hecker, the reasonably narrow framing of the report gives a strong bias towards certain areas of 
technical compliance28and perhaps underplays the differences between regulations on paper and in practice, 
particularly where a business may come up against political constraints, such as the presence of competition from 
regime-connected firms in a particular market or industry or the need to pay bribes to facilitate ostensibly simple 
bureaucratic procedures. As ESI point out, the rankings also exclude potentially key indicators for investment 
decision-making such as: ‘security; market size; macroeconomic stability; state of the financial system; and level of 
training and skills of the labour force’.29 
 
The EBRD, founded in 1990 to help underpin the economic and political transition of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, faces some particular challenges operating in the region today. Article 1 of the EBRD’s basic 
documents states that ‘In contributing to economic progress and reconstruction, the purpose of the Bank shall be 
to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial 
initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty 
democracy, pluralism and market economics’ (emphasis added).30  
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 World Bank Group, Doing Business: Economy Rankings, June 2015, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings   
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 Starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering a property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across 
borders and enforcing contracts. 
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 Gerald Knaus, Pumpkins, outliers and the Doing Business illusion, ESI, November 2014, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=67&newsletter_ID=85 
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 EBRD, Basic documents of the EBRD, May 1990, 
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EBRD officials openly admit that they have had to stretch their mandate to respond to the fact that many of the 
countries in their area of operation are not electoral democracies and show no real signs of moving in that 
direction. The EBRD no longer provides new lending to Uzbekistan, has very limited exposure in Turkmenistan and 
has frozen lending to Russia in the wake of its actions in Ukraine. However its third- and fourth-largest investment 
countries in the region are Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, both countries where energy reserves can help create 
potentially attractive economic opportunities but where it requires a willing suspension of disbelief to describe 
them as ‘committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy and pluralism’.31 In practice, to limit 
lending to countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy and pluralism would limit 
lending to only Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan (all with caveats). At the very least the EBRD needs to 
examine how it can further give preferential treatment in its lending to those countries attempting to comply with 
its official mandate and look at rebalancing its investments towards those countries. 
 
Gubad Ibadoghlu’s piece highlights some of the challenges facing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI). As with the Doing Business report, EITI is a scheme used as a maker of reform by governments seeking to 
promote themselves as an investment destination. It shows how, after a government crackdown on NGOs that 
were part of the formal EITI civil society coalition, EITI suspended Azerbaijan’s compliant status and downgraded it 
again to that of a candidate country. This was not a small thing for either side: Azerbaijan was the first country to 
achieve EITI compliant status32, a fact used extensively by the government of Azerbaijan in its promotional 
materials and something that created a significant reputational risk for EITI. It is worth noting a key structural 
difference in the development process of the EITI in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that helps explain why the latter 
remains a compliant country despite a similarly poor human rights record. In the 2000s when Azerbaijan was 
working with the EITI to become compliant, despite significant restrictions on fundamental freedoms the country 
was home to a quite resilient and vibrant independent NGO sector, a number of whom were able to play an active 
role Azerbaijan’s EITI civil society coalition. The subsequent crackdown on independent NGOs meant that formal 
participants in the EITI process were being targeted, creating a particular institutional pressure for the EITI board to 
react. The composition of the Kazakhstani NGO coalition was formed at the outset with a greater preponderance of 
government-sympathetic NGOs and small groups with limited capacity, making it less likely that NGOs would seek 
to challenge its EITI-compliant status. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, EITI’s two compliant countries in the region, 
are currently considering further restrictions on NGO freedoms.33 How both their constituent NGO coalitions and 
EITI respond to these developments may give a clear indication of the former’s independence, and the latter’s 
willingness to assess the wider political environment in which activities in the extractive sector take place in order 
to achieve real transparency and accountability. While not just a problem for the FSU, there would seem to be a 
need for the EITI to review the processes by which it monitors the independence of its participant NGOs, 
particularly in the formation of the initial coalition. 
 
The other institutions 
Although increasingly obscured behind the political momentum pushing the development of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, an organisation whose formal structures are still in their infancy34, the CIS still provides some of 
the institutional architecture for interstate relations between some former Soviet states such as the Minsk 
Convention.35 Rilka Dragneva’s contribution shows how the CIS Parliamentary Assembly (in St Petersburg) echoes 
the form of the CoE and OSCE but does not really fulfil their function. Its structural challenges reflect the problems 
in its constituent legislatures, the either entirely or predominantly regime-dominated ‘Potemkin Parliaments’ of 
Central Asia, Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The CIS Parliamentary Assembly creates model legislation, 
sends election observers and provides Parliamentarians with something to do and an opportunity for travel, much 
as the CoE and OSCE parliamentary institutions do, but without the aspiration of being a meaningful force for 
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change. The CIS Parliamentary Assembly often acts as an external validation source for flawed governance, such as 
in its uncritical role in election observation.  
 
Florian Irminger’s contribution looks at the way the UN’s global human rights institutions operate in Europe and 
draws attention to how the UN’s role in the European and Eurasian space is not seen as a priority either by EU 
member states or by other regions of the world, who see Europe and the FSU as having other institutions that can 
help it look after these issues. Access for Special Rapporteurs, as with the CoE and other institutions, remains a 
major problem in the region, with, for example, Belarus and Uzbekistan rejecting the mandates of Special 
Rapporteurs about their countries or wishing to visit them; and Azerbaijan claiming to be open to a visit by the 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders but never being able to agree a date, while Armenia and Georgia 
have allowed visits and implemented their findings variably. As with the CoE, both the failure to allow Special 
Rapporteurs access and to implement their findings needs to be taken up by other institutions in the region. 
Similarly Universal Period Review recommendations made by member states need to be tracked and applied as 
criteria for engagement by the EU and its member states in diplomacy with countries in the region. Florian Irminger 
draws attention to the bizarre oversight that the Special Mechanisms (including the Special Rapporteurs) fail to 
publish their findings on particular countries in local languages, not even in Russian (an official UN language), 
something that needs to be addressed if their work is to have local impact.   
 
On a more positive note, as Libby McVeigh sets out in her contribution, INTERPOL has shown that when institutions 
fully understand the need to reform, steps can be taken to address bureaucratic failings. Challenges requiring 
significant political input will always be a bigger task.  
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What our authors say 
 
Dr. Hrant Kostanyan writes that six years after the introduction of the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s drive for 
promotion of democracy and human rights has slowed down. Three variables account for this ‘normative emptying’ 
of EU policies vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space: 1) the resistance of neighbours to EU promoted reforms; 2) the EU’s 
inconsistent reaction to human rights violations; and 3) contestation by Russia. The November 2015 ENP review 
analysed the complex realities in the EU neighbourhood and moved policy in a more pragmatic direction. It is more 
realistic, differentiated and focused. Yet, the EU’s experiment with pragmatic ‘semi-realpolitik’ should in no way 
come at the expense of its normative agenda. Promotion of democracy and support for human rights ought to be 
truly streamlined in the EU’s policies rather than abandoned. 
 
Tinatin Tsertsvadze says that although the European Parliament is one of the most outspoken EU institutions when 
it comes to voicing human rights concerns, its positions and statements do not always have a meaningful impact 
across Eastern Partnership and Central Asian countries. The EP should put in place a comprehensive follow-up 
system guaranteeing that all resolutions adopted by the EP are included in every policy and interaction MEPs have 
with respective countries; in addition, EP positions should be upheld by other EU institutions and taken into 
account in bilateral negotiations, delivering the concerns voiced by the EP to FSU governments. Despite the 
challenges in the region, consistency in the EU’s positions can make a difference and bring about step-by-step 
changes, given the economic and strategic importance of the EU to these countries. 
 
Dr. Beata Martin- Rozumilowicz analyses the emerging challenges to ODIHR election observation and charts the 
issues that need to be dealt with if international election observation is to maintain its current standard of 
impartiality, independence and professionalism. It looks at the difficulties posed by individual participating States 
within the OSCE, issues regarding other international institutions, and also the financial problems within the OSCE 
that have emerged, especially since the advent of the global financial crisis. It puts forward the changes needed if 
impartial election observation is to serve as a vehicle for election integrity in this important region for the future.  
 
Anna Chernova’s article looks at some of the trends affecting the relevance of the OSCE and its human security 
commitments in today’s European context. It aims to explore the challenges and opportunities faced by OSCE 
institutions, with a particular focus on the Parliamentary Assembly, and recommends possible solutions, including 
more substantive engagement with civil society, more emphasis on political pluralism and a greater commitment to 
a shift in decision-making processes.  
 
Kate Levine’s essay focuses on some of the challenges facing the European Court of Human Rights in Russia, 
Ukraine, and the South Caucasus, including: the unprecedented wave of politically motivated arrests, detentions 
and convictions of human rights defenders and civil society activists in Azerbaijan; legislative and judicial efforts to 
restrict independent NGOs in Russia; rising attacks on LGBTI persons in Russia, Georgia and Armenia; and gross 
human rights abuses arising from the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Levine’s essay explores the ECtHR’s response to 
the challenge of ensuring effective implementation of its judgements, identifying where progress has been made, 
and considers where further concerns lie.  
 
Rebecca Vincent examines the rocky relationship between the CoE and Azerbaijan. In particular it addresses the 
unresolved issue of political prisoners that culminated with the defeat of a key resolution in January 2013 in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) that marked a victory for Azerbaijan’s lobbyists and a 
significant blow to the human rights community. Vincent argues that the Azerbaijani authorities saw the move as 
carte blanche to continue politically motivated arrests, which sharply increased immediately afterwards. PACE 
continues to allow Azerbaijan’s noncompliance to undermine the very point and purpose of the CoE, damaging its 
credibility. Vincent argues that the CoE must solve its PACE problem, before this damage becomes irreversible and 
jeopardises the future of the entire body. 
 
Dr. Rilka Dragneva explores the development of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (IPA) of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) from the collapse of the Soviet Union until the present day. She shows how its role 
developing model laws has had little impact on issues relating to human rights. The IPA struggles with the weak 
nature of its constituent legislature and the dominance of Russia within the CIS. 
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Libby McVeigh describes the steps which INTERPOL has taken to address the challenges it faces in ensuring that 
individual rights are adequately protected. Drawing on cases from Azerbaijan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Belarus 
involving politically-motivated INTERPOL alerts, she explains that reform has become necessary due to the 
inadequate implementation of INTERPOL’s constitutional human rights obligations and the lack of an effective 
avenue of redress for individuals wishing to challenge misuse of INTERPOL’s systems. Her essay provides an analysis 
of the internal and external drivers of recent reforms and shows INTERPOL’s desire for change. 
 
Florian Irminger examines the effectiveness and universality of the UN in addressing the increasingly worrying 
situation of human rights defenders in Eastern Europe. The essay draws on first-hand experience addressing human 
rights within the UN system, and combines this with on-the-ground reporting by NGOs in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Together, this informs an analysis of the UN’s effectiveness in 
promoting and protecting civil and political rights in Europe, considering the UN’s inconsistent approach in 
addressing human rights degradations and how independent voices and UN rapporteurs have struggled to engage 
with governments in the region. 
 
Charles Hecker writes that multilateral development banks face a series of pressures in lending to countries that 
are opaque, subject to weak corporate governance or run by authoritarian regimes. While trying to promote a 
reform, they face due diligence challenges, competition from private sector banks and a lack of clarity in 
international human rights law. Across the CIS, weak corporate governance and elite networks with vested 
interests create further hurdles.  
 
Gubad Ibadoglu describes the implementation of EITI in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, focusing on the role played by 
civil society in its progress. He examines the problems facing civil society, the response of the EITI Board to these 
issues and challenges implementing the new standards.  
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The European Neighbourhood Policy reviewed: 
Shifting from value-driven to classical foreign policy 
Dr. Hrant Kostanyan36 
 
After the Cold War the EU’s policies towards the countries of the former Communist bloc were predominantly 
values driven. However, 11 years after introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and six years 
after the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s drive for promotion of democracy and human right has slowed down. Three 
variables account for this ‘normative emptying’ of EU policies vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space: 1) the resistance of 
neighbours to EU promoted reforms, 2) the EU’s inconsistent reaction to human rights violations and 3) 
contestation of its objectives by Russia. 
 
1) The conditionality and incentives applied by the EU to induce democratisation in the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership did not result in the desired outcomes especially in states governed by authoritarian regimes. They 
rejected appeals to democratise their political systems and oppressed internal dissent - be that political opposition 
or ensuring conditions for a genuinely independent civil society. The EU’s reform agenda has also faced obstacles in 
the non-authoritarian countries of its Eastern neighbourhood where the political and economic elites resorted to a 
more nuanced resistance by engaging in ‘cosmetic’ rather than serious reforms. 
 
2) The EU reaction has been inconsistent vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries’ violations of human rights. Whereas 
the EU imposed sanctions on Belarus, it has done little to address human rights violations in Azerbaijan. Moreover, 
the EU does not react or reacts with watered down statements about serious human rights violations. Structural 
constraints inherent in the EU decision-making process provide some explanations for these inconsistencies. In the 
EU system, foreign policy decisions are made in the Council of the EU (consisting by EU member states’ foreign 
ministers) by unanimity. As some EU member states have prioritised economic, security or energy relations with 
particular neighbours, the EU’s reaction has been incoherent and weak, thus harming its credibility and 
effectiveness. Moreover, the EU member states’ bilateral relations with their Eastern neighbours have not always 
been in line with the EU’s human rights and democratisation agenda. 
 
Institutionally, the human rights agenda takes a back seat in the EU ‘executives’. Since the enactment of the Lisbon 
treaty, political relations with the Eastern Partners are dealt with by the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) 
geographical desks. The EEAS’ Human Rights divisions and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights are 
detached from these geographical desks. This arrangement puts the human rights agenda in a disadvantageous 
position since although the Human Rights divisions in the EEAS cooperate with the geographic desks; the latter lead 
the EU’s policies toward Eastern neighbours. The European Commission’s recently established Director-General of 
the Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) works mainly on programming and allocations of EU 
aid to the neighbours. 
 
3) Not only is what the EU has to offer to Eastern Partners less ‘attractive’ than a membership prospective and the 
greater financial and technical support offered to the countries of the enlargement sphere, it is also not the only 
game in town. The Eurasian Economic Union aims at becoming the Russian-led alternative to the Eastern 
Partnership. The prime offer presented by the Eastern Partnership, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) and the Eurasian Economic Union are technically incompatible, with different regulations and 
tariffs. The countries of the overlapping European and Russian neighbourhoods are therefore faced with a choice. 
However, unlike the Eastern Partnership, the Eurasian Economic Union does not entail human rights and 
democratisation requirements.  
 
In the context of the limited impact on the reform process of the Eastern Partners, the EU’s inability to formulate 
effective policy towards its Eastern neighbourhood and Russia’s renewed challenge, the EU is moving away from 
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value-driven policies to a more interests based approach. The review of the ENP is the latest example of where the 
EU’s policies are undergoing ‘normative emptying’.  
 
Reviewing the ENP 
On 4 March 2015 the EU launched the Joint Consultation Paper on the new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
pledging ‘a thorough re-examination’ of its neighbourhood policy.37 During a more than four month long 
consultation period, the European Commission and the EEAS received 250 contributions from different 
stakeholders including EU institutions and bodies, governments, parliaments, academics, social partners and civil 
society, both in the EU and beyond.  
 
The EEAS’ ENP division and the DG NEAR led the review, while coopering with the human rights managing 
directorate of the EEAS. The consultation resulted in a Joint Communication - the Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which was presented by the High Representative Federica Mogherini and Commissioner 
Johannes Hahn on 18 November 2015.38 The Review analyses the complex realities in the EU’s neighbourhood and 
pushes the policy forward in a more pragmatic direction. It is more realistic, differentiated and focused but less 
value-driven than its predecessors.  
 
Russia’s aggression towards common neighbours; (protracted) conflicts; and the refugee/migration crisis are just 
some of outstanding challenges in the EU’s neighbourhood.  
 
The EU’s neighbourhood is far from being an ‘area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values 
of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’ (Article 8 TEU).  
 
In truth, the EU has only had a modest influence on the affairs of its neighbours. The Review candidly admits that 
the EU will not be able to resolve these challenges alone and that the ENP is merely a part of the solution. Indeed, 
the norm transfer from the EU to the Eastern Partners was less successful than it was the case in the 1990s with 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Although the transfer of the EU acquis to a handful of neighbours that 
have committed to implementing the DCFTA is expected, it is yet to materialise.  
 
In the face of new challenges, the long-term goals of the ENP, such as building a peaceful and prosperous 
neighbourhood with sustainable democracy and a functioning market economy, have been complemented by a 
short- to mid-term objective: the stabilisation of the neighbourhood in security and economic terms through 
incorporation of differentiation is key to the ‘new’ ENP. 
 
Introducing differentiation 
Although the EU’s neighbours have more differences than commonalities, the ENP (with its geographic 
components of the Eastern Partnership and the Union for Mediterranean) will continue to be the single framework 
for defining the EU’s relations with the whole neighbourhood. Keeping the ENP whole is a necessary condition for 
maintaining solidarity among EU member states, some of which prioritise the East over the South and vice versa. 
Incorporating strong differentiation in the policy addresses the diverse needs and desires of the neighbours.  
 
Indeed, doing away with a one-size-fits-all approach and stressing differentiation is a pragmatic acceptance of the 
realities on the ground. In particular, it is a welcome move for the neighbours that are unable or unwilling to accept 
the EU’s prime offers of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA, or indeed the values on which the EU was 
founded.  
 
The Review promotes sub-regional cooperation, which might include countries from the neighbourhood and 
enlargement candidates as well as EU member states. The cooperation is to be advanced through macro-regional 
strategies backed by territorial cooperation programmes. Moreover, thematic frameworks will be developed which 
go beyond the neighbourhood that could include countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The Review 
pledges to introduce more trans-regional initiatives such as the EU- Black Sea and Caspian energy initiative 
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INOGATE and induce cooperation in concrete areas, e.g. in civil aviation. It is however, unclear in what ways this 
approach will be different from previous formats.  
 
The reviewed ENP abandons regular ‘progress’ reports. Instead, differentiation will be applied to reporting on the 
neighbours. The country reports will be more flexible and political, except perhaps for the DCFTA countries. 
Abandoning ‘progress’ reports for the other ENP countries is a significant shift from the enlargement methodology 
of the ‘old’ ENP to a more foreign policy oriented approach proposed by the Review. It is therefore uncertain 
whether human rights and democracy will be central in this new style of reporting.  
 
Yet differentiation has its limitations and should be applied with care. Excessive differentiation might undermine 
what is common in the ENP and risk breaking up the single framework. Introducing a ‘thematic framework’ might 
be of help in maintaining the unity of the ENP. Moreover, the differentiation logic in the Review offers little extra to 
the ‘leaders’ of the Eastern Partnership. And unless there is a profound change in the domestic politics of Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia, their relationship with the EU will continue to be governed by the Association Agreement and 
the DCFTA for many years to come. As expected, the review remains silent on the possibility of granting 
prospective membership sought by the Eastern Partners that are committed to implementing the Association 
Agreements and the DCFTAs. 
 
Focus on economy, migration and security  
The Review identifies a short list of priorities based not on democratic and human rights values but on the common 
interest of the EU and the neighbourhood countries; namely, economic development, migration and security.  
 
Elaborating on the issue of economic cooperation, the Review presents a list of items such as micro-financial 
assistance, modernisation, youth, transport, energy security and climate, reaffirming the EU’s existing support to 
and cooperation with its neighbours. However, earmarking 15 billion EUR in the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument for the 2014-2020 period is not nearly enough to support neighbours in overcoming the serious 
challenges they face. Differentiation in the trade policy vis-à-vis the neighbours is an innovative element. For the 
countries that are not interested in far-reaching and comprehensive DCFTAs, the EU will offer ‘lighter’ and more 
flexible alternatives. For example, the Commission suggests the conclusion of the Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance (ACAAs), without incorporating these agreements in comprehensive DCFTAs (as in the 
case of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). On the one hand, the EU pledges to accept the choice of partner countries 
to define the sectors of industrial products, which are to be covered by the ACAA., On the other hand, the 
conclusion of the ACAA can hardly be seen as ‘flexible’ as the EU makes these agreements strictly conditional upon 
approximation to EU technical regulations, standards and conformity regarding assessment procedures. 
 
In the areas of migration and mobility the Review remains general; it reaffirms already existing initiatives that are 
inspired first and foremost by the EU’s security and welfare concerns. The EU has committed to increasing support 
for those countries that provide shelter to refugees and IDPs, to intensify cooperation on return, readmission and 
reintegration policies, as well as to encourage legal migration.  
 
Although the security dimension is prioritised by the Review, it only scratches the surface of this issue. The ‘new’ 
ENP will be a crucial testing ground for the EU’s relatively new ‘comprehensive approach’, which aims to bring 
together all available tools and policies − security, diplomacy, technical support and financial instruments. The 
comprehensive approach assumes effective cooperation at the inter-institutional level as well as between the 
member states and the EU institutions. No review can make the ENP a success particularly in the area of security, 
unless EU member states align their bilateral policies with the EU towards the neighbourhood countries. Without 
such alignment the ENP will remain predominately a technocratic project.  
 
The Review was a missed opportunity in relation to Russia. The ENP should address the challenge posed by Russia 
in more detail than the woolly commitment to ‘offer ways to strengthen the resilience of the EU’s partners in the 
face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign choices’.39 The new ENP should counter 
Russia’s assertive policy by factoring in the links between Russia and the common neighbours including security ties 
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(such as membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization). After all, Russia has used these links to 
undermine the EU’s polices vis-à-vis its neighbourhood. 
 
From value-driven foreign policy to classical foreign policy  
Although the Review addresses democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights, the normative agenda 
is not a central element in the Joint Communication. When presenting the Review, Commissioner Johannes Hahn 
did not emphasise promotion of democracy and human rights in the neighbourhood: 
 
Our most pressing challenge is the stabilisation of our neighbourhood. Conflicts, terrorism and radicalisation 
threaten us all. But poverty, corruption and poor governance are also sources of insecurity. That is why we 
will refocus relations with our partners where necessary on our genuinely shared common interests. In 
particular economic development, with a major focus on youth employment and skills will be key.40 
 
While outlining five main pillars of the new ENP, High Representative Mogherini did not stress the promotion of 
democracy either. In line with Commissioner Hahn, her focus was on interest rather than values:  
 
First, focus on economic development and job creation; second, cooperation on energy; third, security; 
fourth, migration; fifth, neighbours of the neighbours.41 
 
The new ENP eases the application of its ‘more for more’ principle and completely ignores the principle of ‘less for 
less’, stating that the effects of ‘more for more’ to promote fundamental values and principles are limited, 
especially in countries resistant to change. This outcome is not surprising, given that the principle was upheld only 
at the EU level and member states did not align their bilateral policies with those of the EU. The Review therefore 
pledges to explore a more effective approach to achieving fundamental reforms than the previous ‘more for more’ 
approach. But it remains rather vague on the detail of how this could be achieved.  
 
The differentiated approach of the new neighbourhood policy might complicate the EU’s democracy promotion 
even more. Some neighbouring governments might misuse the differentiation by resisting the human rights 
agenda. Instead, they are likely to insist on focusing on areas such as security, energy and trade, thus getting away 
with serious human rights abuses. 
 
As the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood has been profoundly transformed, so should the EU’s policy. Yet, despite the 
expectations raised through a lengthy consultation process, the new ENP did not manage to break through its 
limitations. Moreover, the Review lacks detail on the implementation of the new ENP. However, the Review does 
represent an important step forward to a differentiated approach to the neighbourhood. But the EU’s experiment 
with pragmatic ‘semi-realpolitik’ should in no way come at the expense of its normative agenda. Promotion of 
democracy and support for human rights ought to be streamlined in the ENP rather than abandoned. 
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The role of the European Parliament in impacting the human rights situation in Eastern Partnership and Central 
Asian countries 
Tinatin (Tika) Tsertsvadze42 
 
Introduction 43 
The European Parliament (EP) has always been the most outspoken of the EU institutions, condemning human 
rights violations across the globe using a range of different instruments discussed in this contribution. In 2009 after 
the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force the EP acquired equal powers to the Council of the European Union, extending 
its role to a set of new areas including cooperation with countries outside of the EU, and obtaining the right to 
approve or reject international agreements.  
 
This paper looks at the various EP bodies and instruments - delegations, committees, political groups, individual 
MEPs, resolutions and reports - and examines how they are streamlining the EP’s positions during dialogues with 
the interlocutors of the respective countries.  
 
The EP is one of the EU’s primary institutions and for its positions to have an impact and be taken up seriously by 
the partner countries, it is imperative that resolutions and statements are not treated as standalone and are 
streamlined into broader EU policies.  
 
This has not always been the case, and has, at times resulted in asymmetric policies and mixed messages to partner 
countries. This does not facilitate the EU’s role in addressing pressing human rights shortcomings that we have 
been witnessing in the last decade in the Eastern Partnership region and Central Asia.  
 
A study commissioned by the EP’s subcommittee on human rights (DROI) and conducted by the FRIDE think tank in 
2012 provides quite a detailed overview and analysis of the impact of EP resolutions in third countries. The study 
focuses on five different regions of the world and draws a comprehensive set of recommendations and 
conclusions. Some aspects of it are relevant for this current study and are used with relevant quotations below.44  
 
European Parliament Delegation(s) 
Countries in the Eastern Partnership region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and 
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) started bilateral relations with the 
EU in the mid-1990s. All but two countries, Belarus and Turkmenistan, signed and ratified the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the EU. A PCA is a basic bilateral framework agreement between the EU and 
the post-Soviet countries, regulating bilateral trade and investment relations as well as establishing the 
Cooperation Council and Corporation Committee45 - facilitating political dialogue and relevant institutions for this 
dialogue.46  
 
The EU-Belarus PCA was signed in 1995 but its ratification by the EP has been frozen since 1997 due to the 
deteriorating human rights situation in the country. The EU-Turkmenistan PCA was signed in 1999 and ratification 
by the EP has been pending ever since due to the abysmal human rights situation in Turkmenistan.  
Within the framework of the PCAs, Parliamentary Cooperation Committees (PCCs) were established with each 
country. Respective Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) within the EP’s Delegations are representing the 
institution at the PCC meetings.47 Each EP Delegation has a chair and two vice-chars. The PCCs are one of the 
institutions overseeing the implementation of the PCA and more specifically the work of the Cooperation Council. 
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Three countries in the Eastern Partnership - Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine - have replaced the PCCs with the 
Parliamentary Association Committees (PACs) following the signature and ratification of the Association 
Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements (AA/DCFTA) in 2014.  
 
PCCs and PACs are composed of MEPs from the respective EP Delegations, and by members of the parliament from 
those countries48. The composition of the EP Delegations is crucial because those MEPs are the key interlocutors 
with the legislators from the partner countries. The agenda of the PCC/PACs is quite broad, overseeing the 
implementation of the agreement, as well as covering the issues of trade, investments as well as democracy, 
human rights and anti-corruption reforms.  
 
With the exception of a PACs which only recently started to take place, PCCs have always conducted ‘closed-door’ 
meetings making it difficult to obtain details of discussions, beyond the official joint statement which is issued in 
the event of the agreement between the parliamentarians on both sides, with these statements often limited to 
listing discussion points rather than substantive detail. Ideally, the EP Delegation(s) should systematically and 
comprehensively follow-up on resolutions and statements adopted by the EP on a given country. How streamlined 
this is depends on MEPs, and more crucially chairs and vice-chairs of the EP delegations.  
 
In January 2015 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Kyrgyzstan: the Homosexual Propaganda Bill49. 
The resolution stressed that ‘eventual adoption of this bill could affect relations with the EU.’ In April 2015, the 
Central Asia Delegation of the EP visited Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to participate in the PCC meeting. At the press 
conference50 held after the PCC, Iveta Grigule, the chair of the Central Asia Delegation said, in response to a 
question, that the resolution was “more of a recommendation by nature” and that the main issue raised by the EP 
was to call on the Kyrgyzstan authorities to make the process of the discussion on anti-gay propaganda bill 
inclusive. With regards to the claim that adoption of this into law would ’affect relations with the EU’, MEP Grigule 
said “I think it is some sort of misunderstanding” and that the “EU establishes the contacts with partner countries 
on a very pragmatic grounds.”51 
 
This is an illustrative example of how MEPs should not undermine the EP’s positions if the latter is to maintain its 
relevance and make a difference in a given country. 
 
European Parliament Committees  
The European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) and Human Rights Sub-Committee (DROI) are the 
most relevant committees for this study. At the same time, the International Trade (INTA) Committee plays a 
crucial formal role when it comes to the trade agreements, which often are part of political agreements.52 The AFET 
committee plays a crucial role in the consideration of the international agreements, discussing the Parliamentary 
report on the proposed agreement and voting on it, before passing it to the plenary for voting if approved in 
committee.  
 
In 2012 the AFET Committee led on the resolution of the EP’s recommendations to the Council, Commission and 
European External Action Service on the negotiations for an EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement.53 The latter is to replace the current PCA. In the resolution, the EP stated ‘that progress in the 
negotiation of the new PCA must be linked to the progress of political reform.’ In the period of negotiations and 
thereafter the Kazakhstani authorities adopted several restrictive laws and amendments to the current Criminal 
and Administrative codes, criminalizing activities of media, NGOs and HR defenders54. Despite this, the EU 
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concluded negotiations in September 2014. The agreement was signed on 21 December 2015 and is due to be 
ratified by the parliaments of the 28 member states as well as by the EP. In the most logical continuation of events 
the EP should stand by its previous position and continue to call for concrete political reforms in Kazakhstan as a 
condition for the ratification.  
 
Turkmenistan, which is one of the most oppressive and closed countries in the world, is one of the two countries in 
the region where the PCA has not yet been ratified by the EP. In 2009 the EP set four conditions for it to ratify the 
PCA: 1) the unconditional release of all political prisoners; 2) the removal of obstacles to freedom of  movement; 3) 
allow access for the International Red Cross and other independent monitors to the country; 4) improvements in 
civil liberties, including for NGOs.  
 
At the time of writing, the Turkmen authorities have met none of these conditions. Despite this, the AFET 
committee planned the consideration for the ratification of the PCA in June 2015, which was postponed, partly due 
to concerns raised by civil society, and will most likely come back on the AFET agenda in early 2016.55  
 
These two cases are classic examples of how EP positions are undermined by political pressure. Other EU 
institutions maintain that this agreement would eventually give more potential to develop the relations between 
EU and Turkmenistan56 and to raise the pressing human rights issues. Similar agreements with neighbouring 
countries did not bring much of this kind of breakthrough, except in the cases where there was a strong political 
will from the respective countries to bring their relations with the EU to a new level by initiating democratic 
reforms. 
 
The EP’s conditionality to ratify certain agreements have sometimes been  questioned by other institutions, 
however it would be naive to assume that the EP can play a credible and persuasive role in impacting the HR 
situation in the partner countries when its positions and conditionality are not streamlined and comprehensibly 
taken up by other institutions. 
 
In another case in 2011 the Committee of International Trade (INTA) played a crucial role in voicing human rights 
concerns about forced and child labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton fields. The EU-Uzbekistan PCA from 1999 does not 
include Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment for the trade in textiles. In 2010 the Council concluded 
negotiations with the Uzbek authorities to amend the PCA and include trade in textiles under the MFN conditions. 
For this to enter into force, the consent of the European Parliament is needed57. In 2011 INTA’s interim report 
tabled for debate at the plenary of the Parliament condemned the use for forced and child labour in the cotton 
harvest in Uzbekistan and set the following conditions for ratification of the protocol:  
1) the eradication of forced labour and forced child labour,  
2) allowing the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) high level tripartite observer mission in 
during the harvest and granting them ‘full freedom of movement and timely access to all locations and 
relevant parties, including in the cotton fields’, and  
3) reforming Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector.58 
 
The INTA postponed further consideration of the inclusion of the textile protocol in the PCA again in May 2015 due 
to insufficient implementation of conditions by Uzbek authorities59. Since 2013 the ILO has been allowed in the 
country to monitor the cotton harvest. The independent report from 2014 confirms a drastic decrease of forced 
child labour in the cotton fields, however it points to the increase of forced adult labour practices, as a substitute 
for young children60. The principled position of the EP has played a decisive role in the international campaign 
around this issue. Despite these gains there remain a number of conditions that need to be met and the EP’s 
continued engagement on this issue will remain important.  
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Political Groups in the European Parliament  
In the current legislature (2014-2019) there are eight political groups, from left to right61. The role of the political 
groups is less evident and at times more informal. The political groups scrutinize the reports and table 
amendments drawn by various committees to the reports before they go for the vote at the plenary. However, it is 
not necessary that all MEPs in a political group vote the same way62. Political groups also table their own versions 
of resolutions (urgency resolutions) which are voted on at the plenary; the final version of these resolutions is often 
a compromise between those groups.  
 
At the same time, the political groups can play a more informal role in shaping debates or resolutions. A number of 
political parties in Eastern Partnership countries are members of some of the European political parties.63This 
informal role has probably been most prominently used in the case of Georgia and Ukraine.  Former Georgian 
President, Michael Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) is a member of the European People’s Party 
(EPP), the biggest party in the EP. Since the change of the government in Georgia in 2012 the EPP has issued a 
number of statements criticizing the Georgian government and pointing to worrying signs of backsliding of 
democracy, which could endanger Georgia’s European integration ambitions.64 The EPP was not so vocal on 
democratic backsliding or human rights violations during the UNM’s time in power in Georgia. In the case of 
Ukraine, in the run up to the 2013 Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit, the European Parliament set out conditions 
for Ukraine for the ratification of the proposed Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area. This included both the release of Yulia Tymoshenko as well as ‘rule of law and internal reform, including a 
credible fight against corruption.’ Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshcyna - Motherland Party, is also a member of the 
EPP.65  
 
It is worth noting that ‘party politics’ is not the most efficient way to address shortcomings in democracy and 
violations of human rights. Domestically it is used for political bargaining and on substance it does not address 
deeper problems in the country. It is always more useful to have a common EP positions, statements and 
resolutions.  
 
Given the current state of affairs in Ukraine - pressing internal reforms and war in the East - Ukraine clearly takes 
central place for the EU in its interactions with the EaP countries. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 
July 2015 between Martin Schulz and Volodymyr Groysman (chairman of Verkhovna Rada) on a comprehensive 
parliamentary support programme for Ukraine. The country was nominated as a priority for parliamentary capacity 
building and dialogue-facilitation activities by the decision of the EP’s Democracy Support and Election 
Coordination Group. A Needs Assessment Mission conducted by former EP president Pat Cox was carried out 
between September and December 2015, on the basis of which a programme of capacity building activities will be 
defined and implemented, gathering not only the EP but also other international cooperation actors.66 
 
This is a very important step to help the Ukrainian parliament strengthen its capacity and law-making powers. 
However this should not be an impediment for the EP to remain critical of reforms and developments in the 
country.  
 
European Parliament resolutions 
The European Parliament adopts several types of resolutions depending on the rules of procedure. Most relevant 
for this study are resolutions on the breach of human rights (rule 98) and resolutions following the debates on 
human rights cases, democracy and rule of law (rule 122), the latter are also known as ‘urgency resolutions.’ The 
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‘urgency resolutions’ are prepared by the political groups with the coordination of Sub-Committee on Human 
Rights (DROI)67, unlike all other types of resolutions, which are prepared by committee secretariats.  
 
During each plenary session, the EP discusses and adopts three urgency resolutions, usually on Thursday 
afternoons when MEPs are often returning to their home countries. This timing frequently results in low 
attendance of MEPs at the debates and votes, thus putting into question the legitimacy and representation of 
these urgency resolutions. On the other hand the political groups prepare these resolutions, thus the resolutions 
carry full weight of political groups. 
 
The European Parliament adopted two very critical resolutions on Azerbaijan’s human rights in 201468 and 201569. 
Both of these resolutions criticized Azerbaijan’s fast deteriorating human rights situation and called the council ‘to 
consider the possibility of targeted sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations, should these 
persist’. 
 
Following the 2015 EP resolution, the Azerbaijani Milli Majlis (Parliament) convened an emergency session to 
discuss the resolution, which resulted in a 'counter-resolution' declaring Azerbaijan's intention to formally 
withdraw from the Euronest PA. As such a development requires a year's advance notice to the EP, the Milli Majlis 
further declared in would suspend its participation in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly during the year in 
question70. At the same time, the Milli Majlis ‘terminated participation in the existing format of the EU Azerbaijan 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.’ In addition, the Azerbaijani authorities cancelled talks with the EEAS 
scheduled to take place in late September to discuss the Strategic Partnership and Modernization Agreement.  
 
The bilateral cooperation between the Milli Majlis and the European Parliament has not borne concrete results 
over the last 7 years. The last PCC between the EP and the Milli Majlis took place in 2012, and the last time the PCC 
was able to adopt joint recommendations dates back to 2008. Even though, in a multilateral context, Azerbaijan did 
welcome the first Euronest Parliamentary Assembly to take place outside the EU and the second ordinary session 
of Euronest Parliamentary Assembly took place in Baku in 201271. The Milli Majlis Delegation to the Euronest PA 
subsequently often gave the impression that it wished to use this forum primarily to raise issues pertaining to 
Nagorno Karabakh- with little effect. 
 
Whether the EP’s critical resolution on the human rights record of Azerbaijan will have any meaningful impact to 
improve the situation in this area remains to be seen, and as mentioned above, it will require consistent follow-up 
by the EP as well as by other institutions, notably by the EEAS. The latter should use the EP’s resolution in its 
negotiations with the Azerbaijani government and push for some concrete deliverables.  
 
EU-Azerbaijani relations have always been complex. The PCA has been in force since 1999. Azerbaijan is part of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and Eastern Partnership (2009). Despite this, Azerbaijani authorities have 
never shown much interest in the Eastern Partnership initiative or in deepening political relations with the EU on 
the similar conditions as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have done recently.  
 
Reasons for this are probably multifaceted. On the one hand the EU considers Azerbaijan as one of a number of 
post-soviet countries in its neighbourhood, attempting to build relations with a traditional integration mechanism 
focussing on political and economic reforms. On the other hand, the EU also regards Azerbaijan as ‘a strategic 
partner’ in the energy field, a status not accorded to the other Eastern Partners.72 This mismatch of EU rhetoric and 
actions is probably one of the many reasons why the EU has been facing difficulties in finding a political solution to 
the current state of affairs in Azerbaijan - a country on the verge of becoming a ‘closed country.’ While the EU does 
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not seem have a strategy on how to address the steadily deteriorating human rights situation and how to balance 
its energy diversification interests. Any agreement the EU will eventually negotiate with Azerbaijan will come to the 
EP for approval. Thus the EEAS/EC voicing the EP’s positions during the interactions and negotiations with 
Azerbaijani authorities will make the process in the EP at a later stage more comprehensive and policy oriented. 
  
Conclusions 
What the impact of the EP’s positions and actions in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Central Asian countries in 
relation to the human rights situation or how local political elites react to the EP’s statements depends on several 
internal and external factors to the EP.  
 
Firstly, it remains questionable whether a statement, resolution or an action of a single institution can have an 
impact on any country. It is more likely that impact can be made by streamlining and fine-tuning policies of various 
EU institutions, while at the same time complementing the work of other relevant international organisations such 
as UN, CoE and others.  
 
Secondly, internally it is crucial that any EP resolution or statement is comprehensibly followed-up by all its 
relevant members, bodies and hierarchy (committees and delegations during the inter-parliamentary meetings to 
ask follow-up questions to partner countries as well as to the other EU institutions). Policies will have weight when 
they are not stand-alone actions or papers, but are taken up by MEPs at every opportunity with the interlocutors of 
the respective country.   
 
Lastly, other EU initiations, but more crucially the European Commission (EC) and European External Action Service 
(EEAS) should utilize the EP’s resolutions and positions in the process of negotiations with respective countries. At 
times, the EP’s positions have been perceived to hamper institutional relations rather than be used as a part of the 
process, and more importantly to obtain progress in political reforms. For example, disregarding the EP’s positions 
in the process of negotiations of international agreements can potentially lead to more work. The EP’s approval is 
needed on any international agreement. On the other hand this can potentially lead to prolonged inter-institutional 
negotiations centred on technicalities rather than the reforms. 
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ODIHR, Election observation and the path ahead 
Dr. Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz73 
 
Modern election observation has been on-going for some three decades, since a human rights framework was first 
applied to an electoral process in the Philippines in 1986. Since that time, many advances have been made, both in 
terms of election observations' professionalism and methodology. During this period, the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE /ODIHR) has stood at the 
forefront of this endeavour, especially in the European and former Soviet Union (FSU) space and has developed a 
capacity and an expertise for observing elections in this region. For example during the recent Ukrainian snap 
elections in 2014, ODIHR was able to deploy nearly 2,000 international observers across the country. ODIHR 
currently stands as one of the key institutions in the world and is widely respected for the integrity, impartiality, 
and professionalism of its election observation exercises. 
 
Yet the path ahead for ODIHR election observation holds many obstacles. Of particular importance are a number of 
challenges that must be faced if the credibility of this activity is to be maintained. Key among them are political 
challenges from some participating States to limit the scope and depth of its evaluations, challenges from within 
the organization where various elements vie for attention in this high-profile activity, and financial challenges that 
stand to erode the foundations of election observation from its core. These various themes will be explored and 
analysed in this article as a path forward is charted. 
 
The first challenge is one that has been on-going for more than a decade; in fact, from the early 2000s. Since then, 
an initiative to politically limit the scope and depth of ODIHR election observation has been underway by a group of 
like-minded 'participating States' (pS) that consider this part of the OSCE's work to be too sensitive and 
controversial.74 In their efforts, they have sought to limit: 1) the number of observers to be deployed, generally 
recommending some 50 in every country, 2) the choice of mission members, arguing that especially the head of an 
election observation mission should be appointed by the OSCE Permanent Council (PC) thereby requiring 
unanimous consent,75 and 3) that all reports should be first passed by the PC in a consensus process before being 
made public.76 
 
On each count, the argument has been put forward by certain pS that despite ODIHR's needs-based approach, 
which seeks to tailor the format of an election observation exercise to the particular needs of a country at a 
particular time,77 all ODIHR election observation exercises should be of the same duration, format and scope. This 
derives from an understanding among this subset of pS that election observation should be more along the lines of 
an information exchange than the in-depth formal assessment mechanism that it has come to embody, and that 
the evaluation of electoral processes and the making of recommendations on their improvement touches upon 
fundamental national sovereignty questions. While it is no doubt true that electoral issues are matters of national 
sovereignty, it is also true that they are about fundamental human rights, and as such, are appropriately of interest 
to the international community. In short, the erosion of such elements would severely impact upon the 
independence and professionalism of the exercise, something that is readily acknowledged by many, including by 
some of the states proposing this. 
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At the same time, election observation is widely acknowledged to be one of the 'flagship' activities of the OSCE. 
The mid-1990's saw a profusion of organizations and institutions engaged in this area, with a concomitant 
confusion and redundancy. Thus, a number of efforts were made in the late 1990s / early 2000s, especially after 
some high-profile debacles in the Balkans, especially with OSCE both administering while at the same time and 
observing the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following this, it was made clear that ODIHR was the institution 
within the organization responsible for elections, that there should be efforts to limit cross-over within the 
organization for implementation and observation, and that OSCE's field operations should engage in election-
related work carefully and in avoidance of conflict of interest. Nevertheless, since that time, many key personnel 
involved in these early periods have cycled out and there is increasing proliferation of election-related activity both 
at the secretariat and field operation level, which is sometimes not adequately coordinated. 
 
There are also a plethora of other international organizations engaged in election-related work at some level. This 
includes the Council of Europe, the European Union, the CIS, the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as well as international non-
governmental organizations such as the Carter Center, Democracy Reporting International (DRI), International 
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI), among others. Although there have been some problems with cross-over in the past, this has been 
largely ameliorated through closer consultation within the Declaration of Principles framework, which ensure much 
better consultation and co-ordination of efforts.78 Nevertheless, although there is good intention and regular 
consultation at the headquarters level, this does not always filter down to the field where some cross-over and 
misunderstanding continues; this is a problem that is recognised and being worked upon explicitly by the 
international community. It does, however, need to be opened up to the wider international community dealing 
with elections, including donors and technical assistance providers, if a true synergy of efforts is to be achieved. A 
reduction of 'donor-shopping' is also necessary; this does occur from time to time, leading to an uncoordinated 
approach at best and organizations working at cross-purposes, at worst. 
 
Since the 1990s, there has also been an essential conflict between the ODIHR, as technical experts on the one side, 
and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, as political pronouncers on electoral processes. While not necessarily in 
fundamental conflict, a tension arose over which institution was in the 'leading' role, with ODIHR promoting the 
idea of an equal and shared role between two independent institutions and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
advocating that all election observation activity should be subsumed under its political leadership. Recently, this 
tension seems to have been ameliorated, with both institutions recognizing that the other has an independently 
and mutually important role to play, although it remains to be seen whether this new detente will hold. 
Nevertheless, this is an important challenge to the integrity and impartiality of election observation since although 
most will agree that these are political processes into which parliamentarians as politicians have important insight, 
an evidence-based assessment grounded in first-hand data collection is crucial if the activity is not to become 
overly politicized and ultimately denuded of substance.79  
 
Finally, there is the issue of financial viability, which challenges the institution and the organization. For nearly a 
decade, the budgetary approach from pS has been one of 'zero nominal growth' (ZNG) - for all intents and purposes 
for the entire budget of the OSCE, this has meant that fixed staff costs have gone up, while overall budgets have 
not, leading to an effective diminishing of programmatic funds to implement activities. While the budget allocated 
to elections in the mid-2000s meant that ODIHR could observe a minimum of 16 and sometimes up to 20 plus 
elections per calendar year, increasing fixed costs and inflation in many OSCE pS has meant that the range by 2016 
is more of the order of 12-16 and declining. Election observation is an activity that has been built up over decades 
and although it is recognized that most OSCE pS have been experiencing prolonged and systematic economic crises 
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preventing them from contributing internationally at the levels that that they once did, the overall ODIHR election 
budget of some EUR 6.5 million is very modest, especially  in comparison to the costs incurred by organizations 
engaged in similar election observations work, such as the EU that spends similar amounts for only one mission or 
the UN, where election missions run into the hundreds of millions. 
 
Unless this problem is confronted directly and with foresight, there is a strong risk that due to carelessness and a 
lack of foresight, the institution and it vital election operations will fall into a state of disrepair that will later be 
regretted by many states, including key European nations such as the UK who have long considered human rights 
work to be integral to their international policy initiatives. And, in fact, the UK has been amongst those that have 
advocated the ZNG regime at the overall organizational level for reasons that are well-founded,80 but which may 
end up being ultimately destructive to those principles that they hold dear. 
 
This financial situation, coupled with the continued political attacks from countries that would prefer not to have 
any independent oversight over their electoral process threatens to spell the demise of impartial, independent, and 
professional election observation in the OSCE region in the medium to long term. This is especially concerning as 
important elections in countries such Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation are on the cards for 2016. In 
laying out these tensions and challenges for the future, it is hoped that a path can be found to ensure credible, 
evidence-based, and impartial election observation as a vehicle for elections with integrity in this critically 
important region for the future. 
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OSCE on human rights and democracy: Risks and opportunities  
Anna Chernova81 
 
Upholding international human rights commitments in today’s wider European security context remains a 
challenge. A regression in democratic commitments, evidenced by poor election track records, recorded by the 
OSCE, is further complicating democracy and human rights in the former Soviet space. 
 
As elected officials in free societies, parliamentarians in the wider region are well placed to address these trends 
and should work to prioritize fostering party-to-party and peer-to-peer contacts, as well as challenging increasingly 
repressive systems in several OSCE participating States. Stronger engagement among political parties – in and out 
of parliament, would strengthen political pluralism and contribute to broadening rights-based engagement - 
beyond national interest. European, American and Canadian parliamentarians have the flexibility to operate 
independently of their Foreign Ministries, and to engage in debates and policy discussions beyond the priorities – 
often economic – outlined by their respective governments. Many parliamentarians from the former Soviet space 
cannot avail themselves of such options.  
 
A free media environment and established traditions of civic freedoms allow European politicians to constructively 
engage civil society, rights defenders and socio-political movements across wider Europe in ways that many others 
cannot. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly can serve as a key European platform in ensuring that human security 
on the continent is truly comprehensive.  
 
Today’s context – trends and causes 
With global priorities constantly shifting, organizations and institutions tasked with holding governments to 
account on human rights and democracy play an essential role. There is a general regression in this regard evident 
in several of the 57-participating States of the OSCE. Whole regions and countries, including but not limited to, 
Central Asia, Eastern Europe and now Central Europe82 are backsliding in their democratic commitments (as 
defined by the Copenhagen Document).83 Human rights defenders and OSCE institutions have been raising the 
issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan,84 Belarus (where they are regularly held hostage to European 
negotiations)85 and other states for years. There is increased repression through policy and practice, and serious 
challenges to media freedom in several countries, and arguably whole regions of the OSCE.  
 
Some 25 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it is clear that because so many social issues 
remained unaddressed, a full economic and political transformation has not taken place, and some countries are 
‘lost in transition.’86  
 
At the same time – there is a worrying trend in Europe and the United States in the electoral rise of the far-right, 
often pitting human rights frameworks and commitments against populist calls for tough counter-terrorism and 
anti-immigration measures. This is evidenced inter alia by legislative changes in the US post 9/11, policies on 
extraordinary rendition, the debate around the impact of a potential UK withdrawal from the European Court of 
Human Rights frameworks87 and the erosion of the historic Schengen agreement over the migration issue. The 
success of (what were previously considered ‘fringe’) right-wing parties in an increasing number of European states 
is worrying many human rights defenders at home and abroad. There has been a worrying trend of investment 
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from East-to-West in these movements,88 including conferences organized along particular political platforms and 
values89 that run counter to the OSCE’s human dimension commitments.  
   
A number of rights groups in the West have called attention to civic rights being compromised.  From the Occupy 
protests, to activism in Europe against war, austerity and the rise of the far right we see a trend of civil society 
resisting what they see as an increasingly restrictive environment for fundamental freedoms, democracy and civil 
society space more broadly.90 Increasingly, the connection to the root causes of these social movements and trends 
of both right and left point to increasing global inequalities and poorly designed austerity measures.91  
 
European societies are the lucky ones; at least for now – they live in countries where citizens and even non-citizens 
are able to freely express their views, challenge the system and engage with the media to shape public opinion. 
Most former Soviet states have increasingly struggled to meet their OSCE commitments, and some openly 
disregard and violate them in the field of human rights and democracy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, for 
the first time, we see an increasing number states question their democratic commitments and associated OSCE 
values.  
 
Human rights forms a part of the OSCE’s (herein referred to as the Organisation) Human Dimension, and a core 
aspect of comprehensive human security which lies at the core of the Organization. Prioritising human rights, good 
governance and democracy, however, in a consensus-based organization focused on dialogue – remains a delicate 
balancing act. The European relationship with Belarus vis-a-vis Ukraine is the most recent example. Human rights 
defenders and political opposition in Belarus, where leading opposition figures are regularly held hostage in 
international relations, felt overlooked92 by the thaw between the West and Minsk in favour of a ‘grand bargain on 
Ukraine.’ The Organization, including its Parliamentary Assembly is also careful on which human rights issues it 
chooses to address - often in favour of quiet diplomacy and maintaining a dialogue.93 Democratic deficits in Turkey, 
for example, including challenges around counter-terrorism and law enforcement are rarely publicly addressed.  
 
Institutional influence of the OSCE and key issues of concern 
The OSCE has a number of instruments and institutions that deal with human rights issues.  Some are more 
constrained by the consensus mechanism than others. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, for 
example, is one of the most efficient and consistently outspoken in the Organization, and often comes under 
criticism by the less-democratic of OSCE members for advocating for the safety of journalists and media 
freedoms.94   
 
The pitfalls of consensus 
As an organization that generally works through consensus, wider regional democratic trends are evident through 
debates around ‘double standards’ and wider commitments in the Permanent Council which largely operates by 
consensus across the 57 participating States. The same applies to the Ministerial Council and Summits (on the rare 
occasion the Organization is able to gather one). The annual OSCE Ministerial Council has not been able to adopt 
any substantive text on the human dimension for many years, and the last Council meeting in Belgrade in 
December 2015 was no exception. The OSCE’s parliamentary human rights’ Committee Chair noted this missed 
opportunity to take key human dimension decisions.95 The Serbian OSCE Chairmanship expressed some of their 
frustrations to the press, but as Germany takes over the Chairmanship in 2016 (with a heavy focus on regional 
security issues) – these systems will continue to hamstring the Organization.96 This is largely due to the restrictive 
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consensus rule, but also a visible erosion of commitments to comprehensive human security by key OSCE 
participating States and the relative regression in human rights in democracy in whole regions covered by the 
Organization.  
 
If Permanent Council meetings were open to the press or civil society, the public could judge for themselves. At a 
minimum, the Council’s transcripts could be made publicly available. OSCE decision-making has been hamstrung by 
consensus rules for some time – at times undermining the recruitment of individuals with strong, public records of 
being outspoken on human rights issues for key posts.  
 
One key OSCE participating State, particularly fond of the consensus mechanism (otherwise known and/or applied 
as a ‘veto’ in other inter-governmental bodies) notes that ‘it is unacceptable to prioritise issues on which the 
Organisation has no consensus: the ‘special rights’ of journalists and bloggers, making a fetish of freedoms on- and 
off-line, the freedom of assembly and associations, the role of women, non-traditional faiths and LGBT.’97 Coupled 
with the success of socially conservative and right-wing parties in recent Western European elections – there is a 
clear and present danger that the OSCE’s values around comprehensive human security are under threat.  
 
The Organization’s challenges are primarily political in nature – and while structural and organizational reforms can 
help – deeper political dialogue (and will) is needed to make the OSCE more effective in today’s comprehensive 
human security context.  
 
OSCE’s permanent field monitoring and reporting capacities 
Erosion of OSCE field missions is a key issue. In the last 15 years, the Organisation has been forced to shut down 
several key missions – from Chechnya/Russia, to Georgia, Belarus and Azerbaijan.98 Many missions have been 
downgraded to project coordinator offices, like in Kazakhstan (without a monitoring and reporting mandate, 
including on key human rights developments). The mandate and operational modalities, as well as the diplomatic 
leadership of these missions are largely decided by the Permanent Council.   
 
The debate around the Organisation’s latest in the Ukraine monitoring effort99 is a good indication of some the 
challenges the Organization, and its institutions, face in today’s context. Where issues of territorial integrity are 
concerned, the OSCE often struggles to balance its security and conflict resolution priorities, with its human 
dimension commitments. The German OSCE Chairmanship this year will face these challenges, as it focuses on 
conflict and security issues.100  
 
The role of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and OSCE human rights mechanisms  
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly fights for genuine parliamentary oversight of the executive – to reflect the 
position of some of its European counterparts.  However, as the OSCE continues to move toward achieving its legal 
identity at a glacial pace – the Assembly’s resolutions continue to be non-binding. Bona fide two-way relations 
between the OSCE’s parliamentary and executive dimension remains to be fully developed. This leaves many of the 
Assembly’s human rights initiatives outside the executive structures of the OSCE and its participating States.   
 
The budget of Assembly does not go through the Permanent Council, making the Assembly’s Secretariat 
independent of the consensus-rule hamstringing of the executive branch.  However, when it comes to general 
voting - like in many institutions there are challenges around larger and more powerful, including resource-rich, 
participating States in maintaining a proportional influence and balance. As the quality of elections in many OSCE 
participating States in the region deteriorate, the parliamentary delegations to inter-parliamentary institutions run 
the risk of becoming less representative of political elements in a given society.   
 
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – including members of national parliaments from 57 OSCE participating States 
is a key institution in upholding the human dimension. The OSCE’s executive often acknowledges the role the 
Assembly plays in raising key security issues around territorial integrity, and keeping comprehensive human 
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security concerns (like Guantanamo Bay) on the OSCE agenda.101 The Assembly has called for greater transparency 
of the OSCE executive - including the Permanent Council - full mandates for field missions and greater resourcing of 
the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).   
 
The Assembly works to contribute to conflict mediation and prevention through parliamentary dialogue – with past 
efforts including its Working Groups on Belarus, Moldova and support to the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission.102 
While this work is hard to measure – its activities around public advocacy are more visible. As an independent 
institution, the Assembly is well placed to raise awareness of key human rights issues – directly and indirectly - with 
participating States. As such, the Assembly was able to bring forth debates and resolutions on issues controversial 
for the consensus-driven executive, such as the ‘Magnitsky Act’ (Russia)103 and political prisoners (Belarus), and 
lend support to struggling human rights instruments like the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism – which was designed to 
allow the Organization to deploy investigative efforts in cases of grave human rights concerns 104 – but like in other 
institutions, access to the country in question has remained an issue.105 More widely, the Assembly’s Committee 
for Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions regularly advocates for key OSCE human dimension 
issues through its resolutions,106 but also the active press presence of its Chair.   
 
The Assembly can (and has) challenged credentials of its Members and whole Delegations,107 but overall its status 
remains consultative and its decisions non-binding. It fights hard to defend this position – and not be treated as a 
subordinate institution of the executive. As the OSCE continues to build its legal identity, these issues will continue 
to be debated among its professional staff and legal counsel in the wider OSCE family. What is important for policy 
makers to note is the added value an independent parliamentary institution of 57 parliaments can make at a time 
of great challenges to European security, democracy and human rights, and to the OSCE specifically - as one of 
several inter-governmental institutions dealing with these challenges.  
 
The same legal status issue applies to much of the OSCE as a whole, as evidenced by the loss of field missions in 
countries like Azerbaijan, where missions can be unilaterally closed by the host government at times of great 
shortcomings in the human dimension, with no repercussions for Baku. There are sadly too many examples of 
these cases.   
 
Parliamentary trends and civil society space 
Political pluralism, a key OSCE democratic commitment, has reduced in a number of former Soviet states and 
several parliaments (and therefore their delegations to international institutions) no longer include genuine 
opposition representatives. There are a number of countries, where cycle-after-cycle of elections falling below 
OSCE standards have resulted in national parliaments with no genuine debate or plurality. Other countries have 
banned political parties altogether – also in violation of their OSCE democratic commitments. 
 
Political groups do not play as formal a role in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) as they do in Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. They tend to gather (independently of the Secretariat or the Assembly 
Committees) around issues or key elections to Assembly bodies. While these groups have tangential influence on 
the resolutions the Assembly adopts, political groups do influence elections to the Assembly’s Bureau (that 
oversees the work of the parliament’s committees) to arrange informal political and geographical rotations of posts 
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(something encouraged, but not required by the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure). Generally, the internal election 
results of the PA’s Presidents and Vice-Presidents, as well as Committee leaders tend to reflect the geographical 
and the political diversity of the overall Assembly. However, there are always exceptions – especially when it comes 
to gender, age and representatives of opposition parties in respective parliaments, especially in the former Soviet 
space. Although it is not mandated by the rules,108 the Assembly – for better or worse – tends to reflect the 
political and demographic make-up of many its participating parliaments.  
 
An organization is the sum of its parts. As conservative and reactionary politics take hold of many countries in the 
region, the human rights voices within the OSCE struggle to be heard. The same applies to the OSCE PA which 
brings together members of national parliaments from across the 57 states through a largely proportional system. 
Therefore, when political parties of the right-wing persuasion gain power in Western Europe, the membership of 
the inter-parliamentary assemblies109 reflect these changes.  
 
The space for political freedoms is shrinking, together with the space for civil society. Several countries in the 
region no longer field any bona fide opposition parliamentarians, often because true opposition is no longer 
represented in the national parliament.  
 
Civil society and human rights defenders, as well as independent media, often at great risk – work to fill the void. A 
more systematic engagement with civil society, including through permanent advisory boards, as well as more 
transparent observation and participation mechanisms, would enhance debate and serve the PA and other OSCE 
institutions well. The PA’s debates on the future strategic focus of the OSCE in the human dimension have already 
shown promise in this regard.110  
 
OSCE and elections in the region 
There has been a long debate about election standards – with a wide mix of agendas, from East to West to 
organizational reform issues, to resources and capacities. Despite all the disagreements over the years on 
modalities, and approaches in the highly diverse region – one thing all OSCE institutions support is that existing 
democratic commitments made in 1990 should in no way be undermined. The OSCE has increasingly worked to 
observe elections East and West of Vienna.  
 
The PA’s role, in close cooperation with the OSCE ODIHR, enhances the political element of election observation. 
When measuring elections against the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Commitments – the credibility of these institutions 
is enhanced when they are able to work together. Like the legislation and democratic environment, each election 
observation mission is unique in its own way.  There have been challenges in Azerbaijan,111 Kazakhstan112 and other 
OSCE participating States when the international election observation could not agree on a joint statement – and 
regrettably very different public assessments were made. Some states seem to regularly attract a divergence of 
opinion on democratic commitments.113 Accountability mechanisms need to be further strengthened as the 
election observation field continues to develop to avoid situations where leading observers deviate from the 
statement – as on Azerbaijan in 2013,114 and Kazakhstan in 2011.115 Thankfully, these incidents remain exceptions 
to the rule.  
 
It is worth noting that there are few repercussions for states not inviting observers, or limiting OSCE observer 
access and freedom of movement. Here we do see a trend –decreasing OSCE field presences. Several OSCE states 
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with clear democratic deficits have not hosted full election observation missions – hosting only small or limited 
observation efforts. The trend is not universally negative – some states, like Turkmenistan and the UK116 have 
increased multi-lateral co-operation and have hosted OSCE election observation efforts for the first time in the last 
decade, while others – like Azerbaijan, have increasingly placed restrictions on observers. In Azerbaijan’s case, the 
OSCE cancelled its last election observation effort because of such restrictions by Baku.117 There are key elections 
in the former Soviet space this year and these will continue to shape multi-lateral policy in this regard.  
 
Strengthening OSCE institutions in the human dimension 
The challenges and trends outlined above notwithstanding, there are some steps that can be taken by OSCE 
institutions to improve their impact with regard to human rights and democracy in the region:  
- Only key decisions should be undertaken by consensus to reduce political deadlock and increase relevance 
of key OSCE institutions. If the organization wants to continue to set itself apart in terms of relevance and 
efficiency, it must recognize that the current framework will eventually lead to a stalemate; 
- Permanent Council meetings should be more open to the public, and there should be a permanent 
mechanism to engage civil society with the Council and the executive (in addition to, not instead of, the 
ODIHR’s Annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw); 
- The Parliamentary Assembly should establish a mechanism to engage civil society systematically, including 
through permanent advisory boards and a more transparent registration mechanism; 
- In order to be more relevant, the OSCE must address negative trends with regard to the 1990 Copenhagen 
commitments, including re-open or re-invigorate fully-mandated missions (including monitoring and 
reporting functions) field missions in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan,118 Belarus, Ukraine119 and Russia.    
- The Organization can benefit from more consistent cooperation (i.e. joint sessions/meetings) with other 
relevant intergovernmental Organizations, like the Council of Europe; 
- The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE must have greater oversight of the executive; 
- Foreign Ministries and Parliaments must ensure the OSCE moves much more quickly toward achieving a 
full legal identity – with full legal, including diplomatic, recognition in all OSCE participating states.   
 
Some of these issues are well documented and analysed, but political will and true investment – including from 
European Foreign Ministries and Parliaments – is often lacking. Considering the trends in human rights and 
democracy in the former Soviet Union, the OSCE, including its Parliamentary Assembly, should reform and adjust 
much more quickly than the current pace – if the Organization wants to remain relevant and effectively contribute 
to comprehensive human security in the wider European region.  
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The European Court of Human Rights: A beacon of hope 
Kate Levine120 
 
‘Our strength is our unity of purpose’121 
Introduction  
With jurisdiction over 800 million inhabitants of the member states of the Council of Europe, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) based in Strasbourg, has been referred to as the ‘linchpin’ of human rights protection in 
Europe.122 The European Convention on Human Rights (herein referred to as the European Convention), which the 
ECtHR seeks to enforce, binds States parties to a common set of standards designed to secure fundamental rights. 
Together, the ECtHR and the European Convention provide a ‘unity of purpose’ for member States of the Council of 
Europe. Now in its 57th year, the ECtHR’s ability to withstand challenges to this common purpose from some of the 
Council of Europe’s newest (and oldest) members is being sorely tested. This essay considers aspects of the ECtHR’s 
relationship with Russia, Ukraine, and the South Caucasus: the lack of political will to properly implement 
judgments, the shrinking space for human rights defenders, and increasing State support for so-called ‘traditional 
values’ are identified as three of the most pressing concerns for the ECtHR in this region. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties inherent in addressing these issues, the ECtHR remains a beacon of hope for continued and improved 
‘unity of purpose’ (that is, the effective protection of human rights) in the States of the former Soviet Union, and 
throughout the Council of Europe.  
 
Expanding the reach of the ECtHR  
Originally conceived in 1949 as a project for post-war cooperation among 10 Western European States, the Council 
of Europe has since grown to encompass 47 member states.123 Pursuant to Article 1(a) of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe, member states agree to strive for greater unity for the purpose of ‘safeguarding and realising the ideals 
and principles which are their common heritage’.124 The European Convention, which entered into force in 1953, 
sought to define these ideals and give concrete expression to the principles set out in the non-binding Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights of 1948.125 Established in 1959, the ECtHR was tasked with monitoring respect for 
Convention rights by member states. On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction extended to 23 states. Over the next nine years, its jurisdiction expanded to include a further 18 newly 
independent states, the majority of which had been a part of the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc (including Russia, 
Ukraine and Georgia). 126 In the first decade of the 21st century, an additional six states ratified the European 
Convention (including Azerbaijan and Armenia).127 Expansion of the geographic scope of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction 
has facilitated access to justice for individual victims of human rights violations, but has also (unsurprisingly) 
increased the burden on the ECtHR’s capacity to respond effectively to a significantly larger caseload.  
 
Enabling access to justice  
Affording recourse to the ECtHR as a forum for international justice been particularly significant for victims of 
human rights violations arising in the context of armed conflict in the former Soviet Union. The past two and a half 
decades have tragically seen a number of violent conflicts in this region. For example: in Russia (the first and 
second Chechen wars, and the on-going security operations in the North Caucasus); between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in relation to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory; in Georgia (the August 2008 war with Russia over 
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South Ossetia and Abkhazia); and most recently, in Ukraine, following the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak 
of fighting in Eastern Ukraine.128  
 
In Russia, the actions of security forces in the second Chechen war (which commenced in September 1999) and 
subsequent security operations in other parts of the North Caucasus, gave rise to hundreds of applications to the 
ECtHR on behalf of victims and their families.129 In February 2005, the ECtHR issued its first judgments (and the first 
of any international judicial body) in cases concerning the second Chechen war. 130 The ECtHR found Russia 
responsible for extra-judicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and failing to properly investigate these 
crimes; it also confirmed the systemic nature of human rights abuses by Russian security forces in Chechnya .To 
date there are over 250 judgments from the ECtHR in which Russia has been found responsible for serious and 
systemic human rights violations in the context of the second Chechen war and security operations in the North 
Caucasus.131 Even in the absence of changes to Russian law and policy resulting from these judgments (discussed 
further below), the body of Chechen cases represents the measure of justice, accountability and redress (including 
through the payment of moral damages) for individuals whose appeals to the domestic authorities were largely 
met with disbelief and denial. As emphasised by one of the applicants in the ECtHR case concerning Russian 
responsibility for the massive loss of civilian life during the Beslan school siege in 2004: ‘we were told that we 
would find justice in Strasbourg. This is our only hope. It comforts us that there is a place where everything is done 
by the rule of law, and where our evidence will be considered when the decision is made’.132  
 
The ECtHR very recently issued judgments in two cases relating to the rights of families from Azerbaijan and 
Armenia who were forced to flee their homes as a result of the 27 year conflict in and around the disputed 
Nagorno-Karabakh region.133 The ECtHR underlined that the glacial pace of peace negotiations (under the auspices 
of the OSCE Minsk Group) did not absolve the two States from taking other measures to ensure the property rights 
of individuals directly impacted by the conflict. The ECtHR recommended that each State establish a property 
claims mechanism through which the applicants (and hundreds of thousands of others in the same situation) could 
seek restoration of their property rights and compensation for their loss of enjoyment.134 Although the judgments 
have yet to be implemented, their potential to add much needed political (and legal) impetus for a swift resolution 
of the conflict and access to redress for victims, should not be underestimated.135  
 
Challenges facing the ECtHR 
 
Failure to implement ECtHR judgments  
The ECtHR has faced countless challenges to its mission since its creation. Political resistance to ensuring effective 
implementation of its judgments (particularly those raising systemic violations) is arguably among the most 
grievous, and is of serious concern for the ECtHR, the Committee of Ministers (the Council of Europe’s political 
body tasked with supervising execution of the ECtHR’s judgments), and the individuals for whom Strasbourg is the 
only avenue of redress when structural violations at the domestic level prevail. In two recent reports on the 
execution of the ECtHR’s judgments, the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe identified Russia and Ukraine as two of the nine States with the greatest number of ‘leading judgments’ 
that have yet to be enforced.136 Among the structural problems identified in these unexecuted judgments are: lack 
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of accountability for the actions of the security forces in the North Caucasus; prohibition of LGBT assemblies in 
Russia; and torture and ill-treatment in police custody and failure to investigate these crimes in Russia and 
Ukraine.137  
 
In an ominous development at the end of 2015, President Putin signed into law a new piece of legislation that 
allows the Russian Constitutional Court to declare rulings of international bodies ‘impossible to implement’.138 
Although not the first legislative attempt to curb the efficacy of the ECtHR in Russia, the new law is unprecedented 
in the history of the Convention in that it seeks to deny the enforceability of the ECtHR’s judgments (as opposed to 
merely challenging the relationship between the ECtHR and the domestic courts, which previous Russian laws have 
done, and which other Council of Europe members continue to do, including the UK). According to one of its 
sponsors in the Russian Duma, the main aim of the new law is to ‘safeguard Russian legal sovereignty’; an objective 
which strongly echoes the efforts of Prime Minister Cameron and others in the United Kingdom to redraw the 
relationship with Strasbourg so as to ‘protect’ the supreme voice of Parliament and the Supreme Court.139 One of 
the driving forces behind political opposition to Strasbourg in the United Kingdom is the Prime Minister’s reputed 
distaste for the ECtHR’s finding that the blanket ban on prisoner voting contravenes the European Convention (as 
manifested in the persistent failure of the UK to implement the ECtHR’s judgments on this issue).140 Disturbingly, 
there is evidence that the new law in Russia is not only inspired by the United Kingdom’s pushback against the 
ECtHR’s judgments, but is also motivated by Strasbourg’s ruling against Russia in relation to prisoner voting.141  
 
In Ukraine, the political reforms driven by the events of Euromaidan in 2014 have led to some positive 
developments in the implementation of ECtHR judgments. One such example is the reinstatement of former 
Supreme Court Judge, Oleksandr Volkov in February 2015. Mr Volkov’s politically motivated dismissal in 2010 led 
the ECtHR to find violations of his right to a fair trial and respect for private life, order his re-instatement and call 
on Ukraine to reform its system of judicial discipline.142 Further, in cooperation with the Council of Europe, the new 
Government is implementing a project of widespread reform of the judiciary, in light of the ECtHR’s judgment in 
Volkov v. Ukraine and another similar case (Salov v. Ukraine).143  
 
Notwithstanding these positive developments, the failure to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine poses a 
challenge for the ECtHR. As noted above, there are already more than 1,400 individual applications lodged before 
the ECtHR relating to the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine and the events in Crimea.144 That these situations have 
generated such a significant volume of cases in under two years is not surprising, given the deeply political nature 
of the conflict, the ongoing ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in Donbas, and the refusal of Russia to acknowledge its role in 
these events. The resulting applications add to an existing backlog of cases, the efficient and speedy processing of 
which has been (and remains) a key focus of intergovernmental efforts to reform the Strasbourg machinery. 
Change has come through, for example, Protocol No. 14 to the Convention (which entered into force in 2010, and 
introduced new judicial formations for the simplest cases and a new admissibility criterion), the introduction of a  
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‘priority policy’ in 2009 (pursuant to which applications are dealt with based on the importance and urgency of the 
issues raised, as opposed to the date on which they were received by the ECtHR), and the Interlaken, Izmir and 
Brighton Declarations of 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively (one of the results of which was the adoption of the 
rather contentious Protocol No. 15).145 Significant progress has been made so far; for example, the backlog of 
manifestly inadmissible applications has been cleared, and the total number of applications pending before a 
judicial formation has more than halved, from around 152,000 in 2012 to 64,850.146 Among the remaining 
challenges are the rising number of ‘priority’ applications (and many from eastern Ukraine may fall into this 
category if they deal with, for example, risks to the life and health of applicants), and the backlog of non-priority 
non-repetitive applications.147 While the allocation of additional resources may help to increase capacity within the 
ECtHR, the effective implementation of judgments at the national level is also clearly fundamental to reducing the 
overall number of applications submitted to Strasbourg.  
 
Shrinking space for human rights defenders 
Alongside political resistance to implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments, the shrinking space for human rights 
defenders is also cause for concern for the ECtHR. Following President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, there 
have been renewed efforts by the state to stigmatise human rights activists (labelling them as stooges of ‘Western’ 
interests) and constrict the space within which civil society can operate. These efforts are concentrated on a raft of 
laws designed to severely limit cooperation between Russian NGOs and the West, and clamp down on the 
legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression in Russia. Two such laws, the 
2014 ‘Foreign Agents’ law and the law on ‘undesirable organisations’, have been heavily criticised as falling foul of 
international standards on the rights to freedom of association, expression, and the derivative right of the access to 
foreign funding.148 In response to the ‘Foreign Agents’ law, 14 Russian NGOs submitted a joint application to the 
ECtHR in 2013 alleging violations of their rights to freedom of association and expression as a result of the law. The 
ECtHR has yet to communicate the application to the Government. Although this delay is regrettable, it is hoped 
that the application may ultimately lead to an objective, irrefutable finding of the law’s contravention of the 
European Convention, adding to existing (non-binding) statements from the international community.  
 
Numerous applications have also been submitted to the ECtHR concerning alleged unlawful violations of the rights 
to freedom of expression and peaceful protest; many in relation to demonstrations against alleged fraud during the 
2011 legislative elections and the 2012 Presidential election in Russia, the adoption and implementation of the 
Federal ‘Anti-LGTBI’ law, and the war in eastern Ukraine.  In a recent judgment in one of these cases, Frumkin v. 
Russia, the ECtHR found violations of the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly and association, resulting from 
his unlawful arrest, detention, and ensuing conviction after his participation in one of the ‘Bolotnaya Square’ 
protests in May 2012.149 The ECtHR emphasized the chilling effect of the applicant’s treatment on participation in 
peaceful demonstrations and engagement with opposition politics in Russia, signalling a robust and timely 
statement in defence of the right to peaceful protest which is under severe pressure.150  
 
In Azerbaijan, the Government has overseen a wave of politically motivated arrests and prosecutions starting in 
mid-2014, preceded by a tightening of NGOs laws.151 In less than two years, the state has succeeded in all but 
crippling the country’s independent civil society. It is widely believed that the persecution of particularly high 
profile human rights defenders, including Intigam Aliyev, Rasul Jafarov and Leyla and Arif Yunus, was motivated by 
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their engagement with the ECtHR and other Council of Europe mechanisms.  For example, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights has publically stated that the unlawful arrest, detention and conviction of these 
activists (among others) was retribution for their tireless work promoting human rights through the ECtHR, the 
Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly.152 The ECtHR has prioritised the applications dealing with 
their arrest, detention and conditions of detention, and communicated them to the Government within a few 
months from when they were lodged. These cases are now awaiting judgment. Several of these applications raise 
the claim that their arrest and detention was politically motivated (contrary to Article 18 of the Convention). 
Unfortunately not all cases concerning the repression of critical voices have been communicated as quickly (for 
example, several applications relating to the arrest and prosecution of youth activists belonging to the NIDA Civic 
Movement were recently communicated, two years after being lodged).153 That said, the recent decision of the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe to launch an inquiry (under Article 52 of the Convention) into 
Azerbaijan’s compliance with its rights and obligations will continue to focus international attention on the 
Government’s repression of civil society.154 Although there have been at least eight inquiries under Article 52, this 
is the first launched by the current Secretary General (who took office in 2009) and will (uniquely) involve the 
dispatch of a delegation from Strasbourg to Azerbaijan. Whatever the outcome of the inquiry, it is hoped that the 
findings may provide further impetus for calls to release critics of the Government who are unlawfully detained.155 
  
Attacks on LGBTI rights 
Alongside the crackdown on human rights defenders, attacks against supporters of LGBTI rights and the LGBTI 
community are especially prevalent in Russia and the South Caucasus. Low levels of respect for LGBTI rights mirrors 
the resurgence in popular support for so-called ‘traditional values’ (referring to, for example, stereotyped 
definitions of ‘family’ and ‘morals’, often informed by the policies and preferences of the Orthodox Church, and 
encouraged by supportive statements from the political elite).156 In June 2013 Russia passed a federal law 
effectively legalising discrimination based on sexual orientation.157 Armenia threatened to do the same.158 
Common to all governments in the region is a lack of political will to take anti-LGBTI violence seriously, whether 
perpetrated by state actors or private individuals. Those targeted by state and non-state entities are increasingly 
invoking the assistance of the ECtHR.159 In response, the ECtHR has vigorously defended the right to freedom of 
assembly for LGBTI persons; for example, in the landmark judgment of Alekseyev v. Russia, the ECtHR found 
violations of the applicant’s right to peaceful assembly resulting from the state’s repeated ban on ‘gay pride’ 
marches that he had organised. 160 When it was published in 2010, the judgment was the most significant 
statement from the ECtHR yet on the need to protect the right to freedom of assembly for LGBTI people. 161 In a 
subsequent judgment, Identoba v. Georgia,162 the ECtHR has further developed its support for LGBTI rights through 
its finding that homophobic attacks against peaceful protestors violated the prohibition against ill-treatment and 
constituted discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.163  
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Unfortunately, the ECtHR’s judgments have not resulted in measurable improvements in respect for LGBTI rights in 
Russia. The majority of peaceful demonstrations continue to be banned, and in January 2016 the Duma considered 
yet another homophobic law which proposes jail terms for public displays of ‘non-heterosexual orientation or 
gender identity’.164 In contrast, while public support for LGBTI rights remains low in Georgia, there have been 
positive developments in the judicial and legislative arenas as part of political negotiations with the EU.165 For 
example, the recent introduction of a law prohibiting discrimination on all grounds (including sexual orientation 
and gender identity) was, in part, the result of EU requests made in the context of negotiations on visa 
liberalisation.166  
 
Conclusion 
Efforts by Russia and some of its neighbours to repress human rights defenders, and promote an agenda of 
‘traditional values’ at the expense of the rights and obligations enshrined in the European Convention, have been 
met with fierce resistance by the ECtHR. Similarly, opposition from Russia and other parts of the former Soviet 
Union (and beyond) to execute especially strategic ECtHR judgments has in part fuelled efforts to strengthen the 
ECtHR framework (most recently evidenced by the Brussels Declaration which was adopted by all Council of Europe 
member states in March 2015). The Declaration focuses on improving implementation of ECtHR judgments, and 
sets out, for example, a range of proposals on how states could better engage judicial and legislative bodies in this 
process.167 Ultimately, the practical realisation of the Declaration’s proposals, as with implementation of 
judgments, remains a question of political will. This suggests that reciprocity (for example, from one member state 
to another, and between them and international institutions) is a necessary component of the process of using the 
ECtHR and other international mechanisms to achieve positive change at the national level.  
 
In Georgia, for example, we have seen that tying adherence to Convention standards with mutually beneficial 
political goals can yield positive results for human rights. Given the current state of diplomatic relations between 
Russia and the West, it may be a while before there will be meaningful opportunities to use the ECtHR’s judgments 
as leverage in the context of political dialogue with Moscow. Whatever the future holds for Russia and the wider 
former Soviet Union region, it is crucial that the individuals whose rights are protected by the Convention are able 
to access the ECtHR. For them and for us all in the Council of Europe the ECtHR remains a beacon of hope for the 
effective protection of our human rights whatever politics prevail. 
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The Council of Europe and Azerbaijan: A cautionary tale 
Rebecca Vincent168 
 
Azerbaijan’s history with the Council of Europe since becoming a member in 2001 is complex. The issue of political 
prisoners has always been something of a thorn in the side of Azerbaijan-Council of Europe relations. It was one of 
the main points discussed in the accession process, and Azerbaijan committed to resolving the issue on becoming a 
Council of Europe member.169 In the early years of its Council of Europe membership, under then-President Heydar 
Aliyev, the Azerbaijani government worked with special rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (PACE) to examine cases and draw up lists of political prisoners. As a result, the Azerbaijani government 
released hundreds of political prisoners – though notably did not quite fully comply, as three prisoners from the 
initial list remain jailed to this day. 
 
Heydar Aliyev’s son Ilham went on to succeed him as president shortly before Heydar’s death in 2003. Ilham Aliyev 
soon proved less willing to negotiate on the issue of political prisoners than his father. The Azerbaijani government 
began actively lobbying on the matter, convincing PACE not to appoint a rapporteur in 2005, and then deflecting 
attention when a new special rapporteur, German MP Christoph Strässer, was eventually appointed in 2009, 
successfully drawing focus for several years on the need for a definition of political prisoners rather than 
examination of the situation within Azerbaijan itself. 
 
A definition was adopted in a PACE resolution in October 2012, and yet the Azerbaijani government continued to 
refuse to cooperate with Strässer, preventing him from travelling to the country for a fact-finding visit in 
accordance with his mandate. Strässer proceeded anyway, conducting research from abroad, producing a list of 
possible cases of political prisoners and an accompanying draft resolution.170 
 
The issue came to a head in January 2013 when PACE voted on the draft resolution on ‘The follow up to the issue of 
political prisoners in Azerbaijan’.171 The resolution, which would have been crucial in the Council of Europe’s efforts 
to hold Azerbaijan accountable for its obligations as a member state, was defeated in a vote of 125 to 79. The move 
was a major victory for Azerbaijan’s lobbyists, and a blow to the human rights community. The Aliyev regime 
seemed to interpret this result as carte blanche to carry on with politically motivated arrests - which accelerated in 
the run-up to the October 2013 presidential election that saw Ilham Aliyev elected to a controversial third term in 
office, following the removal of the presidential term limitation in a 2009 referendum. On the eve of the election, 
Azerbaijani rights groups reported a shocking total of 142 cases of political prisoners; a sharp increase from the 70 
detailed in Strässer’s report.172 
 
Fast-forward to May 2014. In the midst of an even worse human rights crackdown on the ground, Azerbaijan took 
over the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers. At the very time when implementation of its Council of 
Europe obligations was lowest, Azerbaijan assumed political leadership of the body. President Aliyev travelled to 
Strasbourg that June where he insisted in an address to the assembly that “all fundamental freedoms are respected 
in Azerbaijan”.173 Aliyev denied the existence of political prisoners in the country, and became visibly angered when 
pressed on the matter by UK MP Paul Flynn.174 He also must have found it difficult to ignore a protest staged by 
Azerbaijani activists in the session whilst he spoke.175 
 
Aliyev returned home from Strasbourg to oversee an even more intense wave of the crackdown. Between 30 July 
and 8 August 2014, four of Azerbaijan’s most outspoken human rights defenders – Leyla and Arif Yunus, Rasul 
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Jafarov, and Intigam Aliyev – were arrested on a cocktail of fabricated charges; and another, Emin Huseynov, was 
forced into hiding176 also fearing arrest after authorities raided and closed the office of his NGO, the Institute for 
Reporters’ Freedom and Safety.177 Prominent investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova would join them behind 
bars that December.178 Dozens of other political prisoners also remained jailed, including critical journalists, 
bloggers, human rights defenders, youth activists, and politicians. 
 
As Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Nils Muižnieks put it at the end of the country’s six-month 
rotation in office, ‘Azerbaijan will go down in history as the country that carried out an unprecedented crackdown 
on human rights defenders during its chairmanship’. He added ‘The Council of Europe’s primary friends and 
partners in the country have almost all been targeted. While this pains me deeply, it also makes practical 
cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Council of Europe extremely difficult. The reprisals must stop. Now’.179 
 
But the reprisals did not stop. Now, over a year after the end of Azerbaijan’s chairmanship, the human rights 
situation in the country is worse than ever, and yet PACE remains largely willing to allow Azerbaijan to flout its 
obligations. Although outgoing PACE President Anne Brasseur has spoken out regularly on Azerbaijan’s failure to 
uphold its Council of Europe obligations,180 the same cannot be expected from incoming PACE President Pedro 
Agramunt, who will take over during the January 2016 session. Agramunt, a Spanish MP who previously served as a 
co-rapporteur dealing with the monitoring of Azerbaijan, has been criticised as an apologist for the Azerbaijani 
regime and was featured in a report by the European Stability Initiative detailing potentially corrupt lobbying 
practices in PACE, ‘Caviar Diplomacy: How Azerbaijan silenced the Council of Europe’.181 
 
The bias within PACE is hardly limited to Agramunt; the statement of findings of the PACE monitoring delegation to 
Azerbaijan’s November 2015 parliamentary elections is a good example of how pervasive it is. Although the OSCE 
and the European Parliament had taken the unprecedented step of cancelling their monitoring missions, PACE 
ignored calls by human rights groups to do the same and proceeded with its mission.182 Despite ample evidence to 
the contrary,183 the PACE delegation claimed that ‘the voting process was observed to be adequate and generally in 
line with international standards’.184 (It should be noted that, for the first time, three members of the PACE 
monitoring delegation signed a dissenting statement noting that the situation in the country did “not provide 
conditions for holding free and democratic elections”.)185 
 
The situation is not helped by the fact that the head of Azerbaijan’s PACE delegation, Samad Seyidov,186 is currently 
the Acting Chairperson of his political group, the European Conservatives Group,187 giving him a seat at the table in 
the PACE Presidential Committee. This is in addition to his longer-standing role as Vice-Chairperson of the PACE 
Monitoring Committee – the very committee responsible for monitoring Azerbaijan’s implementation of its Council 
of Europe commitments. The conflict of interests seems clear. 
 
Outside of PACE, however, the Council of Europe’s leadership finally appears to be stepping up, and has recently 
enacted several strong measures aimed at holding Azerbaijan accountable. In October 2015, Secretary General 
Thorbjørn Jagland announced that the Council of Europe was withdrawing from the joint civil society-government 
working group on human rights issues in Azerbaijan, a step human rights groups had been requesting for some 
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time due to the lack of independence of participants.188 In December 2015, Jagland announced that he was 
launching an investigation into Azerbaijan’s compliance with its obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights.189 For its part, the Committee of Ministers has also been increasingly vocal, so far calling on three 
separate occasions for the immediate release of jailed opposition leader Ilgar Mammadov, per the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in his case.190 
 
These measures, while significant, are not enough. Some human rights organisations are now calling for the 
suspension of credentials of the Azerbaijani PACE delegation191 which would prevent the delegation from taking 
part in PACE proceedings and send a strong signal to the Azerbaijani government that PACE will not stand idly by 
while the country flouts its human rights obligations. Other groups have already gone a step further, calling for the 
full suspension of Azerbaijan’s Council of Europe membership.192One thing is certain: the behaviour of Azerbaijan’s 
ruling Aliyev regime is not compatible with the very principles upon which the Council of Europe was founded. The 
regime is deliberately violating the same human rights and fundamental freedoms the Council of Europe has 
undertaken to protect and respect, in a widespread and systematic manner – and it is doing so with the implicit 
endorsement of some members of PACE. 
 
As European Stability Initiative Chairman Gerald Knaus has commented many times, rather than the Council of 
Europe influencing Azerbaijan, it is Azerbaijan that has influenced the Council of Europe, and negatively so. As he 
put it in a piece for the Journal of Democracy titled Europe and Azerbaijan: The End of Shame, the Council of 
Europe has ‘crossed over to the dark side’, ’it sold its soul’, later adding ’it was no great challenge for the autocratic 
regime of President Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan to paralyze this system. By capturing the Council of Europe, the 
Azerbaijani government managed to neutralize the core strategy of the international human-rights movement: 
‘naming and shaming’.’193 The attitude of the Azerbaijani government towards the Council of Europe was perhaps 
best summed up in January 2013, in the debate just before the vote that would defeat Strässer’s key resolution on 
political prisoners in Azerbaijan. Head of the Azerbaijani PACE delegation Samad Seyidov stated: “I am completely 
against the approach it takes to Azerbaijan, but I will still be a member of the Assembly because this is not Mr 
Strässer’s Council of Europe; it is my Council of Europe, just as it is my Azerbaijan, as it will be forever”.194 Indeed, 
three years later Seyidov’s words still ring true. 
 
In failing to take serious action to hold the Azerbaijani government accountable for its obligations as a member 
state, the Council of Europe is risking more than just permanent damage to its reputation. It is also bringing into 
question the very point and purpose of the Council of Europe at a time when a founding member, the UK, is 
already considering withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights. Secretary-General Jagland 
himself has even attempted to use the critical human rights situation in Azerbaijan to appeal to the UK to stay in,195 
when in truth, the fact that Azerbaijan has been able to successfully subvert the body for its own political aims 
would be all the more reason to leave.  
 
The Council of Europe continues to serve many important purposes in the region, not least of all through the 
European Court of Human Rights – which represents the only hope of justice for citizens in countries like 
Azerbaijan. But if the Council of Europe’s existence is to continue to be justified, the body must solve not only the 
problem of Azerbaijan’s non-compliance, but the broader problems within PACE, rooting out corruption and taking 
action to hold both member states and individual PACE delegates accountable for their behaviour. Otherwise the 
arguments in defence of the institution’s usefulness in other ways will soon start to wear irreversibly thin. 
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The Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS: Does it have an impact on human rights in the post-Soviet space? 
Dr. Rilka Dragneva196 
 
The Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (IPA) of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the main home-grown 
multilateral body in the post-Soviet region with a mandate related to human rights and humanitarian issues. Since 
its creation, the IPA has been an active body, claiming high political visibility and international standing. Occupying 
the grand Tavricheskiy Palace in St. Petersburg, it has been a forum for parliamentary cooperation, resulting in a 
plethora of acts, including on human rights related matters, adopted by its nine member states’ delegations.197 Its 
profile has been upgraded by member states tasking it with election monitoring in the CIS region, peace-building 
and conflict-resolution activities as well as anti-terrorism cooperation. The IPA cooperated with international and 
European organisations, including the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This cooperation opens 
the potential to disseminate and promote international norms and standards,198 as well as promote awareness of 
and international cooperation in dealing with complex transnational issues.199  
 
Yet, not unlike the CIS itself, the IPA’s role can be described as tangential, trivial and largely symbolic. In relation to 
human rights and democratic standards, more than other areas of governance, the IPA has been largely 
inconsequential. Like the parliaments of its member states, the IPA has tended to follow and legitimise the 
predominantly authoritarian political regimes of its participants. Regionally, the IPA has reflected the existing 
geopolitical asymmetries in either abstaining from engaging with politically sensitive issues, or serving the 
objectives of the regional hegemon, Russia. 
 
The IPA’s genesis  
The IPA’s limited ability to make a difference in relation to human rights was largely the product of its institutional 
origin. Many of its weaknesses reflect the political bargaining following the domestic political and regional tensions 
at the time. The IPA was originally set up in 1992 as an initiative of the national parliaments which were then still 
the unreformed bodies elected as Supreme Soviets in 1990. Overseen by the powerful chairperson of the Russian 
Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the establishment of a parliamentary assembly was part of a distinct unionist 
agenda. Many, including the Russian President Boris Yeltsin were embroiled at the time in a battle with the Duma, 
saw it as ‘bringing back from the dead’ the USSR Supreme Soviet. It was only in 1995 that the IPA was explicitly 
included amongst the CIS bodies. This step paralleled Russia’s rhetorical re-commitment to the post-Soviet space, 
whereby it saw regional leadership as the hallmark of its claim to a ‘Great Power’ status. In this sense, participating 
in the IPA began to be seen as an expression of the commitment to far-reaching, ambitious, Russia-led integration 
within the post-Soviet region. It is not accidental, for example, that membership in the IPA, achieved only in 1999, 
became a milestone in Ukraine’s reluctant, yet prized by Russia, engagement within the CIS. This was even more 
the case after President Putin’s arrival to power. For the Kremlin, the very existence of a regional parliamentary 
body has been viewed as vital in giving legitimacy to its integration projects.200 
 
Institutional mandate 
This genesis of the IPA had important implications. Firstly, the IPA was set up as a consultative body, that is, one 
with no formal power to influence domestic developments. Its core mandate was defined as the approximation of 
member states’ legislation, seen as a necessary precondition for effective cooperation. To this effect, the IPA was 
empowered to be a vehicle for voluntary harmonization and its main outputs are model laws and 
recommendations, which member states decide whether and how to use.201 In theory, such acts can be important 
for domestic legal reform and the promotion of international standards. For example, they create templates that 
can be referred to in domestic drafting which might not always be available, particularly to smaller and poorer 
member states. Yet, in practice, the IPA’s recommendations have tended to remain within the august walls of the 
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Tavricheskiy Palace with little consequence for actual domestic policy- and law-making, typically dominated by the 
priorities and preferences of the often uncontested ruling elites and the interest groups backing them. 
 
Secondly, human rights have been neither clearly nor explicitly defined, nor a core focus of the IPA.  The IPA’s 
mandate relates to the areas of cooperation that may be of member states’ concern and common interest.202 Yet, 
the definition of ‘common interest’ was left vague. In practice, the IPA has dealt with a wide range of matters: from 
investor protection to packaging waste, the status of teachers, and foreign intelligence. The selection of issues has 
tended to be haphazard, reflecting the priorities of its member states’ parliamentary delegations or individual MPs 
at that time.  
 
In effect, only a small number of model laws adopted relate directly to human rights. In the mid-1990s, attentions 
focussed on social and economic rights, deemed under threat by the onslaught of the market economy. In 1994, 
for example, the IPA adopted a Charter of Social Rights and Guarantees. Indeed, the IPA set up a permanent 
committee to work on issues relating to ‘social policy and human rights’. This concern has been supplemented by 
attention to anti-corruption measures,203 and issues of counter-terrorism and transnational crime. Other than that, 
the IPA has maintained a low profile vis-à-vis core political rights and related rule of law matters. Its most 
important function in this field has related to election monitoring. According to its own data, the IPA has monitored 
more than 100 electoral missions and set up a dedicated International Institute for Monitoring the Development of 
Democracy in 2006.204  
 
Ultimately, given the loosely-defined mandate of the IPA and its weak institutional setting, as with other areas of 
cooperation within the CIS, Russia has been able to exploit its position as a regional hegemon in steering the 
workings of the IPA. 
 
Russia’s prominence 
Formally, all member states are equally represented in the IPA, acts are adopted by consensus and every member 
state’s delegation has one vote. Similarly, a wide range of member states’ and regional bodies can propose the 
adoption of an act. Equal national representation also defines the allocation of the chairmanship of the permanent 
committees of the IPA.205 In practice, however, Russia’s role within the organisation has been crucial. It is notable, 
for example, that Russia has chaired the Council of the IPA, it has supplied its nationals as the General Secretaries 
of the Secretariat of the IPA Council, as well as the senior staff (Secretaries) of its permanent committees. Similarly, 
Russia was at the forefront of pursuing Ukraine’s participation in the IPA, securing it after a complex bilateral deal.  
 
Russia’s leadership is notable when reviewing what was done by the IPA, but also by what was not done by it. It is 
striking, for example, that in 2014 there is no evidence suggesting any formal engagement of the IPA with the 
question of the Crimea or the Ukraine crisis.206 Despite the scale of the crisis, including the humanitarian disaster 
following it, the IPA maintained an obedient silence while dedicating vocal attention to causes like the promotion 
of the Sochi Olympics or the economic fate of Cuba.  
 
Domestic political regime 
The effectiveness of the IPA is also circumscribed by the nature of the prevalent political regimes in the post-Soviet 
world. These are regimes where the Executive - the Presidency in particular - is the locus of political power, with 
parliaments’ support ensured by compliant pro-Presidential majorities. Unsurprisingly, the CIS regional institutions 
have replicated a decision-making system centred on the Council of Heads of State, consisting of the Presidents. 
Importantly, the IPA consists of member states delegations, composed of members of national parliaments 
nominated to be part of it. Thus, the composition of the IPA reflects that of domestic parliaments with a heavy 
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preponderance of representatives of the ruling ‘party of power’.207 The result has been a regional assembly that 
has preferred to focus on a wide range of general, yet politically uncontroversial issues. 
 
It is notable, for example, that despite the large number of electoral monitoring missions the IPA has engaged in 
across the CIS region, it has tended to find elections free and transparent, often contrary to international 
consensus. To name just one example, while the report of the PACE observers on the October 2012 Parliamentary 
elections in Ukraine documented ‘grave concerns’ on irregularities ‘liable to vitiate the whole electoral process’,208 
the IPA concluded that the elections were on the whole free, transparent and fair.209 Thus, at a time when the EU 
moved to impose democratic conditionality in the face of blatant authoritarian consolidation, the IPA served to 
legitimise the prevalent status quo.   
 
Future Prospects  
While the CIS as an organisation has become little more than a symbolic label relative to its role in the early 1990s, 
the IPA has remained active and visible, including in potentially fruitful international cooperation opportunities.210 
Its longevity is critically determined by the political importance Russia has attributed to the existence of a regional 
parliamentary body for the legitimacy of its own integration agenda. Its effectiveness as a regional hub able to 
promote standards and provide independent checks and balances in matters of human rights, however, is critically 
restricted by a weak institutional set up, whereby regional asymmetries and authoritarian tendencies prevail. This 
is particularly the case in a political context where key universal norms and values, including the rule of law, are 
easily manipulated and compromised. 
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Vision restored? Reform of INTERPOL to strengthen protection of human rights 
Libby McVeigh211 
 
Introduction 
As the world’s largest international police organisation with a mandate to facilitate global police cooperation in 
fighting crime,212 INTERPOL does not exist to promote the protection of human rights. Its focus is on reducing the 
risks presented by serious cross-border crime and terrorism, one of its key functions being to assist in the location 
and arrest of criminal suspects across borders through the circulation of ‘wanted person’ alerts, including Red 
Notices and Diffusions.  
 
While not central to its mandate, the question of how to ensure that individual rights are adequately protected in 
the context of INTERPOL’s work cannot be avoided. The arrest, detention and extradition facilitated by the 
circulation of INTERPOL alerts each have clear implications for individual rights, while people sitting on INTERPOL’s 
wanted list face restrictions on their freedom of movement, their right to employment and their ability to enjoy a 
family and private life, even if they are not arrested. Further, criminal justice systems are all too often employed as 
a means of oppression. Fair Trials has assisted peaceful activists from Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
Belarus who have sought refuge in exile from criminal charges issued to intimidate them and disrupt their work, 
only to become subject to INTERPOL alerts through which politically-motivated prosecutions can too easily be given 
extra-territorial reach.213  
 
But how does an international organisation like INTERPOL prevent itself from becoming a tool of oppression? Can it 
simply close its eyes to the risks, placing responsibility for human rights violations in the hands of its members, or 
should it keep the challenges in plain sight and put in place safeguards, however unappealing these may be to 
some member countries? Since the publication of Fair Trials’ 2013 report, Strengthening respect for human rights, 
strengthening INTERPOL,214 INTERPOL has recognised the need for improvements in order to enhance its ability to 
protect individual rights and embarked on a process of reform. This contribution provides an overview of the 
challenges which INTERPOL faces in relation to the protection of individual rights and the steps taken to address 
them, before examining the key drivers of the reform process which is currently underway.  
 
The human rights challenge  
INTERPOL has been mindful of its human rights responsibilities since the outset, with its Constitution creating 
relevant obligations when drafted in 1956. Article 2 affirms INTERPOL’s commitment to acting ‘in the spirit of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, while Article 3 provides that ‘it is strictly prohibited for the Organization 
(INTERPOL) to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, religious, racial or military character’. This 
neutrality principle keeps INTERPOL focussed on its aim ‘to contribute effectively to the prevention and 
suppression of ordinary law crimes’215 (emphasis added) while steering clear of political matters which would 
compromise INTERPOL’s independence and in which national criminal justice systems have too frequently been 
employed in ways which violate international standards.  
 
INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data (the ‘RPD’)216 establish further requirements which should serve to 
protect individual rights, through the minimum requirements set out in Article 83 of the Constitution. The de 
minimis requirements, for example, seek to ensure the proportionate use of INTERPOL’s systems and any 
corresponding interferences with individual rights.  
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Despite INTERPOL’s Constitution and rules appearing to address the human rights challenge adequately on paper, 
there are three main ways in which INTERPOL’s response has not been sufficiently robust, making it vulnerable to 
misuse by its members. Firstly, INTERPOL’s interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution is unclear and, in 
some circumstances, appears to be out of line with international standards and practice. There is no guidance on 
the interpretation of Article 2, with the most extensive public articulation of the approach confirming only that 
INTERPOL ‘tries to identify those human rights standards that are relevant to its work and that are well recognized 
on the international level’.217 The case of activist Nadejda Ataeva, the President of the Association of Human Rights 
in Central Asia who was subject to an Uzbek Red Notice from 2000 until 2015 in relation to a politically-motivated 
embezzlement charge supported by evidence extracted under torture, highlights the problems arising from this 
lack of clarity.218  
 
The test which INTERPOL employs to determine whether or not a case is ‘political’ and caught by Article 3 is 
similarly unclear. While international law requires an assessment of whether a criminal prosecution is politically 
motivated,219 there is no published statement that INTERPOL is required to follow the same approach and there are 
numerous cases which demonstrate that its interpretation is out of line with that of national courts. The response 
to the application for deletion of an alert by Petr Silaev, a Russian anti-fascist activist, living in exile in Finland while 
facing prosecution by Russia for his involvement in the Khimki forest demonstrations, is illustrative.220 The request, 
made on the grounds of political motivation, was denied by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files 
(the ‘CCF’) despite the fact that Petr had been granted asylum by Finland and his extradition had been refused by a 
Spanish court for that precise reason.  
 
Secondly, the timing and nature of INTERPOL’s ex ante review of alerts has been subject to criticism. Despite the 
requirement that each alert is reviewed before publication to ensure compliance with INTERPOL’s Constitution and 
Rules,221 since 2009 the introduction of a new system aimed at increasing the speed at which data could be 
circulated enabled member countries to post information directly onto INTERPOL’s database in draft form without 
prior review.222 If the subsequent review found the alert to be non-compliant, it would be deleted, but the pitfalls 
of this approach were highlighted in the case of Ales Michalevic, who faced criminal charges after standing against 
President Lukashenko in the December 2010 elections in Belarus. INTERPOL’s refusal of Belarus’ request for a Red 
Notice did not prevent his arrest in both Poland and the United States due to his name remaining on local 
databases after the alert was circulated in draft form.223 While INTERPOL was able to identify political motivation in 
the case of Ales Michalevic, the information provided by member countries when requesting an alert will often be 
inadequate to facilitate a determination of compliance with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The nature of the 
inquiry conducted by INTERPOL, and particularly the evidential aspects of the review, remains unclear and 
therefore open to criticism. 
 
Thirdly, INTERPOL remains outside the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.224  As such, the main avenue of recourse for 
individuals who wish to challenge the compatibility of a wanted alert with INTERPOL’s Constitution and Rules is an 
application to the CCF – the internal body intended to offer an effective alternative remedy which serves to justify 
INTERPOL’s legal immunity.225 In its current form, however, the CCF fails to offer an avenue of redress which 
complies with international standards of due process. Its proceedings do not ensure equality of arms (not providing 
the defence with access to all information to facilitate a fair hearing) and are characterised by significant delays. 
Azer Samadov, an Azerbaijani political activist granted refugee status by UNHCR having fled his home country after 
supporting the anti-Aliyev opposition movement in the run up to the 2003 presidential elections, waited five years 
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for the CCF to determine that the Red Notice which Azerbaijan had published against him was politically 
motivated.226 Further, CCF decisions when reached are neither reasoned nor published, and there is no right of 
appeal for individuals or member countries who wish to raise challenges.  
 
INTERPOL in reform mode 
In response to the challenges outlined above, INTERPOL has entered into a ‘reform mode’, with its Secretary 
General Jürgen Stock recently urging the General Assembly to ‘be ambitious’ and ‘work together to shape a 
powerful reform agenda’.227 Stock’s rally cry was certainly not limited to plans to improve the protection of human 
rights, but four positive steps taken recently demonstrate INTERPOL’s commitment in this regard.  
 
Firstly, INTERPOL has reasserted control over the data which is published on its databases. In March 2015, Jürgen 
Stock confirmed that changes to the review process have now been instituted to ensure that alerts are not visible 
to other National Central Bureaus (NCBs)228 until they have been reviewed by INTERPOL.229 This represents a 
significant procedural improvement, providing the opportunity for INTERPOL to identify human rights concerns 
before information is circulated to all member countries.  
 
Secondly, in February 2015, guidance was issued confirming that Red Notices and Diffusions will not be published 
in relation to individuals with refugee status granted to protect them from persecution in the country which has 
requested publication of the alert.230 This reform was implemented quickly, with a number of people who had 
languished for some time on INTERPOL’s databases – including Nadejda Ataeva and Azer Samadov – finally being 
released from the chains of INTERPOL alerts. A straightforward policy to apply this reform provided the relevant 
documentation and verification can be obtained, it has been accompanied by reform to CCF practice so that 
decisions have been made uncharacteristically fast in response to fresh applications.  
 
A third significant development was the decision by the General Assembly in November 2014 to amend the RPD to 
require the preparation of a repository of practice on Article 2 of its Constitution.231 No updates have been 
published to date, but it is encouraging that representatives of INTERPOL agreed to meet with members of the UN 
Committee against Torture (UNCAT) in December 2015 to discuss issues relating to the risk of refoulement and 
reliance on torture evidence.232  
 
Finally, INTERPOL has tasked an internal working group (the GTI) with a comprehensive review of INTERPOL’s data 
processing at all levels, including an assessment of the role and procedures of the CCF.233 With over 60 participants 
from 30 member countries participating, the GTI met for the first time in July 2015. Preliminary findings reported to 
the General Assembly in November 2015 which subsequently passed a resolution234 urging member countries to 
provide information promptly to the CCF to enable it to reach decisions in a timely manner and requiring the 
development of ‘specific proposals for possible procedural improvements’. The development of these proposals is 
now underway and it is anticipated that these will be presented to the General Assembly for adoption at the end of 
2016.  
 
In her speech to the General Assembly in November 2015, CCF member Drudeisha Madhub suggested that ‘there is 
no reason why INTERPOL (…) cannot be at the forefront of addressing issues of basic human rights (…), while 
maintaining its fight against international crime’,235 and the progress which INTERPOL has made in addressing 
concerns relating to the protection of individual rights in the context of its work has certainly been promising. But a 
number of challenges do still remain, not least in ensuring that the proposed reforms of the CCF bring its 
                                                             
226
 For further detail, see https://www.fairtrials.org/cases/azer-samadov/ 
227
 Jürgen Stock, INTERPOL Secretary General, Directional Statement at 84
th
 INTERPOL General Assembly Session, 2 November 2015.   
228
 The division of the police, or other investigative service that acts as the national contact point for all INTERPOL related activities.  
229
 Fair Trials, INTERPOL confirms reforms at meeting with Fair Trials, 16 March 2015, https://www.fairtrials.org/press/interpol-continues-constructive-dialogue-with-fair-
trials-international/.   
230
 The policy (IPCQ dated 18/02/2015 (LA/ 51489-4/5.1)) has not been formally published by INTERPOL, but has been shared with Fair Trials and is available at 
https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/INTERPOL-TEXT-ON-REFUGEE-POLICY.pdf.  
231
 Resolution No. 18, AG-2014-RES-18, Amendments to INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data. 
232 
Fair Trials, Fair Trials and REDRESS organise expert meeting of the UN Committee against Torture and INTERPOL, 18 December 2015, https://www.fairtrials.org/press/fair-
trials-and-redress-organise-expert-meeting-of-the-un-committee-against-torture-and-interpol/.  
233
 Resolution No. 19, AG-2014-RES-19, INTERPOL’s supervisory mechanisms concerning the processing of data in the INTERPOL Information System.  
234
 Resolution No. 9, AG-2015-RES-09, Supplementary measures associated with the processing of notices and diffusions.  
235
 2015 General Assembly, Speech by Mrs Drudeisha Madhub (CCF member), 4 November 2015. 
51 
procedures in line with international standards. A further challenge arises from INTERPOL’s status as an 
organisation without a human rights mandate which must, nonetheless, engage in human rights assessments. With 
a limited ability to develop institutional knowledge of the human rights situations in different member countries, 
there is a question which has yet to be adequately addressed on what information INTERPOL could and should 
obtain and rely upon when making such decisions. This was one of the issues which INTERPOL representatives 
discussed with the UNCAT, with the development of information-sharing practices with UN human rights bodies 
being one potential solution.  
 
Drivers of reform 
Given the promising progress which INTERPOL has made in addressing human rights-related criticisms of its work, 
an analysis of the drivers – both internal and external - of the reform initiatives outlined above may prove 
instructive for organisations facing similar challenges. In terms of internal drivers, the protection of the legal 
immunity which INTERPOL enjoys is a key factor. In order to remain outside the jurisdiction of national courts, 
INTERPOL must offer an effective remedy which meets essential guarantees of procedural fairness. It follows that 
while the CCF fails adequately to fulfil this role, INTERPOL’s immunity will remain under threat. In recognition of 
this Jürgen Stock recently informed the General Assembly that the GTI ‘will help build a more robust system that 
will ensure compliance with international standards and consequently provide increased protection to the 
Organization from litigation’.236 In a year when its Secretary General also reminded members about the financial 
deficit faced by INTERPOL when he assumed office and a forthcoming increase to statutory contributions by 
member countries of 3 per cent,237 it is perhaps unsurprising that a desire to avoid financial liability has proven to 
be a strong motivation for reform.  
 
But the internal drivers are not purely financial. The success of INTERPOL depends on member countries placing 
trust in its systems; criticisms made, both implicit and explicit, by international organisations,238 representatives of 
national governments,239 and domestic courts240 in recent years demonstrate that reputational risk is certainly one 
which INTERPOL is right to take seriously. Stock’s decision to conclude INTERPOL’s relationship with FIFA (from 
which his predecessor had accepted a €20million donation for a campaign to tackle match-fixing in 2011,241 only 
four years before news of FIFA’s own corruption scandal broke242) was explained by the need to protect INTERPOL 
from ‘taking decisions that pose a high reputational risk’, emphasising that the trust of member countries is key to 
INTERPOL’s ability ‘to face every single challenge on the way to strengthening police cooperation’.243  
 
International pressure has almost certainly played a role in encouraging INTERPOL to take action. Media coverage 
of the misuse of INTERPOL’s systems has increased since 2013, with individual cases demonstrating compelling 
examples of the deficiencies in INTERPOL’s systems proving a powerful ingredient in the narrative.244 In addition to 
media scrutiny, INTERPOL has also been examined by international and regional bodies, particularly within Europe.  
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The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly has issued calls for 
reforms to INTERPOL in recent annual declarations245 and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders 
has contributed to the work of the GTI. In response to questions from the European Parliament, the European 
Commission has agreed to engage in a dialogue with INTERPOL on these issues and to contribute to its work in the 
field of data protection through a survey of all EU Member States which was circulated at the end of 2015.  
 
Finally, in October 2014, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (the Committee) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe resolved to produce a report – Abusive use of the Interpol system: The need for 
more stringent legal safeguards – under the rapporteurship of German MP Bernd Fabritius.246 The process by which 
the Committee agreed to produce a report on this matter was far from smooth, with certain delegations lobbying 
(albeit unsuccessfully) against the motion and arguably demonstrating self-interest in maintaining the status quo 
with INTERPOL poorly placed to identify political misuse. Having met with representatives of INTERPOL in October 
2015, the rapporteur plans to finalise the report for adoption within the first half of 2016, which should serve to 
maximise the pressure particularly on the GTI to propose effective reforms of the CCF and plug the justice gap 
which exists due to current procedural flaws.  
 
Conclusions 
As an organisation focussed on facilitating international police cooperation, INTERPOL has arguably never been 
blind to the human rights obligations which accompany its work, with constitutional commitments providing a 
guiding light. It is certainly fair to say, however, that its vision in this regard has been impaired by institutional 
ambition in a context of increasing global insecurity, making it vulnerable to manipulation by member countries 
using the ‘wanted person’ alert system as yet another tool of oppression against opponents. Despite not existing to 
promote human rights protection, INTERPOL is notable for adopting a pragmatic approach, recognising that both 
its credibility and immunity will be threatened by a failure to take concrete steps to address concerns which have 
been raised by individuals, civil society and the international community. While challenges remain, INTERPOL has 
implemented much-needed reforms and the impact for individuals whose rights had previously been undermined 
by the existence of Red Notices is already providing significant. 2016 remains a key year, however, during which we 
will witness the reform agenda being finalised and the extent to which INTERPOL’s vision has been fully restored 
will become clear. 
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To ensure its universality, the UN must address the worrying situation of human rights defenders in Eastern 
Europe 
Florian Irminger247 
 
The United Nations (UN) has just marked 70 years since its inception, and this landmark year has brought much 
reflection on the functioning of its institutions. In 2016, a new UN global development agenda will enter into force 
and a new Secretary General will be appointed. But what about human rights – one of the three core pillars of the 
UN?248 The UN Human Rights Council, now in its 10th year, is entrusted to universally promote and protect human 
rights, but events in European countries in recent years have called into question the universal nature and 
effectiveness of the HRC, specifically its motivation and ability to address human rights in Europe. For example, the 
UN has been inaudible in its reaction to Russia’s clampdown on civil society, the media and opposition, and it failed 
to react effectively to Euromaidan in Ukraine and other rapid developments in Eastern Europe. 
 
This essay will examine the UN’s effectiveness in promoting and protecting civil and political rights in Europe. It will 
also consider the UN’s inconsistent approach in addressing human rights concerns and how independent voices 
and UN rapporteurs have struggled to engage with governments in the region. 
 
The Human Rights Council’s inability to address human rights abuses in Europe 
The Human Rights Council (herein referred to as the Council) was established to act as the UN’s political tool to 
address human rights violations, next to the treaty bodies. The UN was founded on the principle of universality, but 
it has failed in 10 years to credibly assess situations developing in Europe – which is directly related to the lack of 
balance of the composition of the Council, politically directed actions that have motives other than to hold parties 
to their human rights obligations, and a lack of willingness from many stakeholders to put human rights violations 
in a European country on the UN agenda.  
 
The effectiveness of the Council is undermined by the uncompetitive, political process to elect states to the 
Council, and the subsequent composition of the Council to include states with dubious-to-dire human rights 
records. The late Václav Havel addressed the situation in 2009, at the time questioning the candidacies of 
Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.249 Excluding Azerbaijan, these states hold seats on the Council 
today. 
 
The Eastern European Group (EEG)250 has notably avoided presenting a candidate to run against the Russian 
Federation. Inevitably, on 12 November 2013, Russia was among the 14 States elected. Why have none of the 
European Union member States from the EEG dared stand in the election against Russia? The EU will have a chance 
to challenge Russia’s re-election at the end of this year, as its three-year term ends. 
 
In November 2013, Ukrainian police responded violently to protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence 
Square), resulting in wider mass protests in December 2013. Soon after, more than a hundred people were shot in 
the streets and mass violence erupted in Kyiv, leading to President Viktor Yanukovych leaving Ukraine and 
ultimately the presidency. The UN was slow to respond, with its first reaction to Euromaidan coming in a statement 
on 21 January 2014, in which the High Commissioner for Human Rights called on ‘all parties to exercise restraint,’251 
but made no mention of the excessive use of violence and provocation by police– even as information was 
available on the now infamously brutal Berkut units.252  This statement followed Ukraine’s adoption of repressive 
legislation aimed at a ‘complete restriction of fundamental rights’ on 17 January 2014.253  
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The second UN reaction came on 19 February 2014 following the death of 22 protestors in Kyiv.254 While 
condemning the killings, the High Commissioner urged ‘the Government and protestors to act to defuse tensions 
and to take swift action to find a peaceful solution to the on-going crisis.’255 
 
These statements do not encourage UN action, and in this they case failed to have any impact on the unfolding 
situation. Clear and timely UN condemnation of police violence should have come; this could have helped to stem 
the violence.256 The UN said even less in its response to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the human rights violations 
that came straight after. 
 
HRHN’s intervention at the Human Rights Council on 7 March 2014 asked the High Commissioner to document the 
work relating to Euromaidan undertaken by the UN’s team in Ukraine, a team which was already quite strong at 
the time and included a human rights presence. HRHN expressed regret that ‘the High Commissioner’s Office has 
not been more proactive in Ukraine,’ and called on the Office to ‘establish a rapid response in the context of 
protests.’ 
 
The Council itself adopted a resolution on cooperation between the UN and Ukraine. This did not reference the 
obligations of Ukraine to investigate the Euromaidan violence and hold those guilty accountable, and it made little 
reference to the structural reforms needed. Significantly, the resolution was led by Ukraine and simply signed off 
by its international partners in the West; other resolutions and statements have since been made by the Council in 
the same manner. This process reflects a complete misuse of the Council, which should base its resolutions on UN 
reporting and other sources. This resolution was not adopted to hold Ukraine and non-State actors in Ukraine to 
their human rights obligations in the aftermath of the Euromaidan crisis, but rather as a tool by European countries 
to show political support to Ukraine. 
 
In Belarus, in contrast to the approach taken in Ukraine, the EU attempted to use the Human Rights Council for its 
designed purpose: to uphold human rights. This attempt followed election-night violence in December 2010, which 
saw mass arrests – including seven presidential candidates – and subsequent repression of civil society, media, and 
political activists. In June 2011, the EU requested that the High Commissioner report on the situation. In June 2012, 
following the conclusions of the report, the EU pushed for the UN to mandate an independent expert to monitor 
the human rights situation in Belarus, to cooperate with Belarusian civil society and to prevent further human 
rights abuses. 
 
This mandate was established but saw resistance from the Office of the High Commissioner, which argued that 
Belarus would in any case not cooperate on civil and political rights – the main focus of the rapporteur. The local 
UN presence in Belarus under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator257 has been unwilling to support the 
mandate, showing the same disregard and ignorance as the Belarusian government. Worse still, the UN 
accompanied Sanaka Samarasinha’s nomination as the new UN Resident Coordinator to Belarus with a statement 
expressing ‘hope that the cooperation between the UN and Belarus will continue to develop successfully.’258 
 
In Geneva, the EU raised the situation of Belarus at the Council, hoping for more involvement from countries from 
other regions. Such support never came, just as it never came for the resolutions and statements on Ukraine. Every 
resolution on Belarus and Ukraine has been adopted with a high level of abstentions from states outside the 
European groups, suggesting issues arising in Europe are not a matter of preoccupation for non-European States. 
Diplomats in Geneva representing some African States, as well as smaller Latin American States, who do not 
necessarily have diplomatic representations in concerned European countries, often invoke that they lack 
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information on the situation to be able to offer a position to their capitals. The truth, however, is that they are 
unwilling to stand up to Russia in particular. 
 
These examples illustrate the difficulty of raising human rights violations at the political level within the UN when 
they concern a European country, and demonstrate the lack of willingness from many sides – the UN itself, 
European States, and States from other regions – to put human rights violations occurring in Europe on the agenda 
of the UN.  
 
The Council is, in general, reluctant to examine country situations. As observed by the Universal Rights Group, ‘the 
Council has consistently prioritised discussion of general thematic issues over addressing country-specific human 
rights situations.’259 The Group documents that 55 per cent of the resolutions adopted since the Council’s creation 
have been on general thematic issues, while country-specific resolutions account for just 7 per cent. 
 
This phenomenon is even more prominent when it comes to European countries, and advocacy of human rights 
groups on European countries is often countered by the argument that these States are members of the Council of 
Europe and that Strasbourg must take care of the problems – often ignoring that Belarus is not a member of the 
Council of Europe.  
 
These issues shatter the belief that, as Yvonne Terlingen put it, the Council is an opportunity for a ‘new era’ in 
human rights marked by less double-standards and politics.260  
 
The reluctance of the Council to focus on country-specific issues is also reflected in UN Special Procedures, in which 
mandates are largely established on thematic issues rather than country situations. The vast majority of non-EU 
states refuse on principle to support country mandates, declaring them intrinsically politicised. European states 
tend to take one of three approaches to Special Procedures: they reject, pretend to collaborate, or truly 
collaborate.  
 
Rejectionists simply do not cooperate with the mandates they dislike, as is the case with Belarus, or they feign 
cooperation with all mandates but manoeuvre to ensure this never materialises - the approach taken by 
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has been officially thanked for extending an invitation to Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur 
on the rights to peaceful assembly and association in his statement on 30 May 2013 at the Human Rights Council. 
However, it appears the mandate holder has never visited Azerbaijan and indeed could not agree on a date with 
the Azerbaijani government. 
 
Ceremonial collaborationists pretend to collaborate with Special Procedures, and may even invite mandate holders 
for official country visits. They ignore the recommendations of Special Procedures and ensure they have no effect 
on the ground or on policy. In Armenia, for example, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, visited the country in 2010 and reported that ‘human rights defenders operate in a 
difficult environment in Armenia,’261 and offered a set of recommendations to improve the situation. However, 
years later, NGOs are still harassed and human rights defenders are verbally and physically attacked when raising 
issues considered delicate, such as gender equality262 or LGBTI rights. 263 
 
True collaborationist states use Special Procedures as tools to improve their policies. States’ engagement with 
special procedures illustrates their willingness – or lack thereof – to truly implement UN human rights 
recommendations at home. 
 
Our experience is also that the United Nations itself, in various countries, does not push for human rights issues to 
be raised. It can even be a force against the promotion of human rights on the ground, as is the case in Belarus. For 
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example, for Belarus’s second review at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the Office of the UN Resident 
Coordinator in Belarus organised training for civil society, but invited only NGOs legally registered in Belarus.264  
 
The largest domestic human rights organisation, Viasna, could not participate, and the organisation’s chairperson, 
Ales Bialiatski, was until recently detained. In its decision of 24 July 2007,265 the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee considered the dissolution of Viasna as a violation of the right to freedom of association, and supported 
Viasna’s right to be re-registered.266 This is a ludicrous situation in which a UN legal body, acting under an 
instrument ratified by the concerned State,267 is not even respected by the UN’s own representation in the country. 
This de facto excluded international actors working on Belarus –  whereas, in such a closed country international 
engagement is essential– as well as domestic NGOs who are banned from public life by Belarusian legislation. 
 
The UPR places a country at the centre of the Council agenda and extends UN participation to local NGOs. Whether 
the UPR can over time become a tool to scrutinise human rights records of European countries will depend on the 
political will of all states to raise those human rights concerns. Low engagement from non-European countries, use 
of the UPR as a praising process rather than as a critical platform and a lack of ability and willingness to implement 
recommendations at home are some of the elements one would need to look into in more detail. 
 
In the countries mentioned, space for civil society is indeed shrinking and the environment is increasingly 
dangerous for human rights defenders. This is further not helped by the poisonous combination of the UN not 
expecting enough when it comes to civil and political rights from European countries, European countries not 
receiving enough attention from Special Procedures, and European countries not doing enough to raise 
developments in other European countries at the UN. 
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Lending, governance and emerging markets: Challenges and responses 
Charles Hecker268 
 
Multilateral financial institutions face important challenges when lending to countries that are opaque, deficient in 
corporate governance or subject to authoritarian rule. These challenges make it difficult to promote and sustain 
the goals of most multilateral banks – the promotion of democracy, market economics, human rights and 
transparency.  
 
Some of the primary difficulties include the level of commitment to integrity and social/human rights due diligence, 
competition between public and private lenders, and debtors’ ability to bring about change. Finally, when recipient 
jurisdictions emphasise form over substance in global business surveys, it is difficult to measure progress on 
reforms. 
 
These issues are particularly acute in Russia and the CIS. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the introduction 
of market economies (however distorted), this part of the world has seen the proliferation of deceptive 
mechanisms – broadly called ‘grey practices’ – designed to skirt the law and mask fraudulent or corrupt 
transactions.  
 
The former Soviet space is also known, though not exclusively, for the role that family groupings play in controlling 
key sectors and assets. Cast your mind back: The Yeltsin administration in Russia was openly called ‘The Family’. 
More recently, the circle of relatives and close associates around deposed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 
carried the same moniker. The Central Asian Republics are no exception, with presidential family members playing 
particularly prominent roles in the economic lives of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The ties in Russia and the CIS are 
not all familial. Business clans based on regional alliances, industry sector or ethnic affinity also play a role in how 
economies are governed.  
 
While these practices are most prominent on the national level, they are repeated on regional and local levels. The 
blurring of public and private in the post-Soviet space, and the financial and administrative mechanisms used to 
disguise it, are a significant source of risk in development lending.  
  
Integrity and social/human rights due diligence 
Where the due diligence process is taken seriously, lending supports development goals more closely. Where due 
diligence is treated as a formality, development goals are harder to sustain. Internal and external pressures on the 
lending institution will determine how well the process works. 
 
Renewed global regulatory pressure means that the attention to due diligence – who are we lending to and what 
risks do they pose? – is higher than ever. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is newly invigorated and aimed at 
key sectors in Russia and the CIS. The newer, but stricter, UK Bribery Act not only seeks to root out corruption at 
home and abroad, but also punishes organisations that fail to prevent corruption.   
 
Still, in the face of this regulatory dynamism, the application of due diligence remains inconsistent. Many public 
and private institutions see due diligence at best as a chore. At worst, they see it as a revenue-destroyer. In the 
public sector, due diligence tends to receive a higher degree of consideration, as it helps safeguard against the 
abuse of public funds.  
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This attitude towards due diligence points to one of the primary tensions accompanying almost all lending 
decisions: incentive to de-emphasise potential integrity obstacles to earning a return on a loan portfolio. To a 
degree, this is counter-intuitive – there should be an incentive to expose risks prior to deciding to lend. The 
problem is that corruption, human rights violations and other social risks – if or when they are exposed – are not 
always seen as potential barriers to loan performance. 
 
In proactive private institutions, due diligence is deployed as an effective risk management tool that helps 
safeguard against the abuse of funds. Institutions with best-practice due diligence programmes are better 
proponents of economic and social reforms, even when lending into complex environments, including authoritarian 
regimes. Thorough due diligence helps lenders sidestep organisations that are corrupt, represent hidden interests 
of the political elite or violate human rights. As part of this process, development banks will avoid politically 
sensitive sectors or activities, thus minimising their exposure to ruling elites and reducing the likelihood they will 
engage with the activities of one or another elite clan.  
 
There are additional internal pitfalls. Multilateral lending agencies – or camps within them – can use personal and 
informal influence to override controls on preferred transactions, moving difficult deals through the approvals 
process without full due diligence. Compensation schemes may incentivise bankers to promote transactions 
without regard for social risks. 
 
In the private sector, individual transactions can also be politicised, either by pressure from the potential client and 
its related parties or by internal pressure to achieve commercial targets. In other words, where the business 
development and regulatory function are not aligned (and where business development takes the lead), proper 
due diligence is often the victim.  
 
There are external challenges to effective due diligence as well. Countries with poor corporate governance have 
little incentive to improve. Vested interests, including those in the political elite, benefit from weaknesses in 
corporate governance and disclosure laws. Without a clear public record of beneficial company ownership, for 
example, even a rigorous due diligence programme will encounter difficulty. Additionally, if lending and 
enhancement in governance by the debtor are not rigorously linked, incentive to change fails. 
 
Moreover, authoritarian regimes are fertile breeding grounds for corrupt practices, in at least two respects. First, 
the regime itself will use corrupt practices to mask the commingling of private and public funds or the diversion of 
public funds in the conduct of business. The use of “administrative resources,” a euphemism to describe the power 
of incumbency, will also be used to direct economic development to favoured circles. 
 
Second, even honest private sector players may use legally questionable business practices to sidestep the punitive 
and arbitrary regulatory regimes typical of authoritarian countries. In doing so, they of course expose themselves 
to regulatory or law enforcement action, thus raising the overall risk profile in the economy. Among these practices 
include the use of ‘one-day companies’ created and liquidated specifically to conduct a specific corrupt transaction, 
the use of various schemes to extract cash from businesses and the widespread use of companies registered in low-
disclosure jurisdictions to hide beneficial ownership.  
 
The lack of clear international law – particularly in the area of human rights – further complicates due diligence. In 
the absence of legislation, multilateral lenders must create their own rules, adhere to international principles or 
rely on a countries’ human rights legislation, where it exists (generally speaking, the UN Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights are considered the gold standard). 269 Each of these options is fraught with challenges. 
International lenders come in for criticism, some of it harsh, for shortcomings in human rights standards in their 
lending activities.270 Most development banks will espouse a policy of ‘engagement’ when dealing with countries 
with controversial human rights records. They will argue that this approach encourages integration with the 
international community. Isolation, they will say, offers no promise for change. 
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Make no mistake: many institutions conduct thorough due diligence and adhere both to the letter and the spirit of 
anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and other regulatory requirements. After all, almost everyone now knows 
that doing business with authoritarian regimes and their cronies carries an elevated level of risk. Not taking even 
basic precautions under these circumstances is no longer acceptable.  
 
The prominence of multilateral organisations; Competition between public and private lenders 
The multilateral banks’ ability to bear higher levels of risk once made them organisations of first resort for lending 
into complex or transition economies. That said, not all of them immediately embraced some of the more difficult 
aspects of lending into difficult jurisdictions. Tackling corruption was initially seen as too politically sensitive for 
some development banks. Addressing human rights issues, for example, is a recent addition to the World Bank’s 
agenda.271 
 
Working to social and economic – as well as a commercial – agendas is not easy for the partners of multilateral 
banks. The conditions attached to multilateral loans are an additional cost of doing business272, albeit one which 
debtors sometimes accept. Admission to the ranks of approved banking partners is broadly seen as a seal of 
approval for debtors and their projects. 
 
Multilateral banks are no longer the only option on the market. Recent trends in development lending include 
increased competition among development banks and nation-state entrants into development lending, including 
China and India.  
 
The private sector, too, has entered the market for loans to transitional economies, supported by the availability of 
political risk insurance. According to one survey, foreign direct investment has been the greatest source of 
replacement funds in the face of declining public sector development assistance.273  
 
Private lending policies, however, lack specific social or political development goals or requirements. Private 
lenders will undertake to comply with, including anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and anti-slavery 
legislation. But their lending practices will not mirror the specific development goals of the public sector.  
 
The growth of private lending into emerging markets has the potential to undermine the goals of development 
banks. While integrity concerns rank high – perhaps higher than ever – in the private sector, they do not receive 
the same emphasis as in multilateral organisations. Borrowers are more inclined to seek money with fewer social 
strings attached, even if that implies paying a private sector premium. Observers at the World Bank note that 
‘where financial resources are provided by sources other than the World Bank Group, strict adherence to 
environmental and social safeguard measures may not be a precondition for disbursement’.274  
 
All is not lost. Austerity and related cutbacks to overseas development has placed additional emphasis on the 
‘results, transparency and value for money’ of lending into low- and middle-income countries and transition 
economies. 275 This comment comes in connection with traditional aid donors (the UK Department for International 
Development and the US Agency for International Development, for example) but also applies to multilateral 
banks.  
 
Multilateral lenders may not be able to save the world. But they are not the only parties responsible for keeping 
deals clean in opaque countries. That said, debtors – the companies that accept development funding, be it from a 
private bank or a public lender – can’t and won’t change the world, either. Lending money to an enterprise – even 
a large one – on its own is not going to transform the economy of the recipient country. In fact, the narrative within 
the multilateral lending community points toward an urgent requirement for constant monitoring and oversight to 
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ensure that development funding is spent as intended. The implication is that without persistent scrutiny, 
compliance is difficult to ensure.  
 
The tendency of the banking community, however, is to move from detailed, rules-based oversight to broader, 
principle-based (and, presumably, lighter-touch) supervision. Moreover, scrutiny of debtor activity is being 
devolved from the creditors either to the regulatory environment of the local jurisdiction or to the debtor itself.  
 
Indices and the success of reform 
If development lending is meant to produce a more transparent, pro-market and democratic world, then there 
must be a way to measure progress against these goals. The World Bank’s annual Ease of Doing Business Report276 
is a prominent benchmark of the business environment in transition economies. 
 
Organisations use the Doing Business report in several ways. A country’s rank for ease of doing business often 
serves as a ‘first cut’ in an investment decision. It is easier to convince a company’s audit or risk committee that an 
emerging market investment is prudent when that country is high or rising in the ratings.  
 
The Doing Business report, however, is relatively open about its shortcomings. It will not tell the reader much 
about what is happening on the enterprise level. It will also not tell the reader much about how a country’s 
commercial and regulatory infrastructure performs, beyond the fact that it exists to one degree or another.  
 
Moreover, much as universities have learned how to rise through now ubiquitous college rating systems, countries, 
too, have learned how to game the World Bank survey. Putting decent laws on the books moves a country up the 
rating system, but it doesn’t always mean the laws are obeyed. Russia, in particular, has come in for criticism in 
connection with its allegedly inflated score on the World Bank index.277 While a change in methodology propelled 
several countries closer to the top, Russia’s ascent up the rankings was notable as it took place amid an economic 
descent. Countries that move up the Doing Business rankings are meant to see increased economic growth as their 
economies become less bureaucratic. Beyond that, Russia’s climb up the rankings – and the ratings writ large – is 
the subject of debate. Russia is seen as a country where regulations that exist on paper are not necessarily 
enforced in practice.278 More broadly, the survey itself is the subject of comment on the apparent difference 
between the efficacy of regulations de jure and de facto.279   
 
There is no question that countries use high scores in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report to boast about their 
favourable investment climate. The annual list is hated by those at the bottom, beloved among those at the top, 
and the subject of fickle affections from those who move up and down its ranks. 
 
Development banks are in an admittedly difficult position when working in emerging markets, including Russia and 
the CIS. The countries in this region are widely acknowledged for presenting difficult governance environments. In 
fact, all lenders face a variety of integrity-based challenges to their activities in the region. At the same time, banks 
have to work in the real world, and development banks have to accept as their points of departure that they are 
working in flawed environments. The most rigorous approaches to these challenges would include a robust, open 
and transparent assessment of risks prior to making a lending decision, an equally strong system of monitoring 
adherence to mandatory governance standards throughout the duration of the loan and a frank appraisal of 
progress achieved when the  loan is extinguished.  
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Examining the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
Gubad Ibadoglu280 
 
The paper looks at the key challenges facing the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) in two former Soviet countries, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Generally the EITI is playing a very significant role 
in attracting investment to national economies and improving revenue management, leading to poverty reduction 
in natural resource rich countries. EITI implementation in a country sends a message to international investors and 
companies about government commitment to enhanced transparency and accountability; thus, the country could 
be perceived as a more attractive investment opportunity, which in turn may contribute to rapid economic growth 
in other sectors. In the long term, an improvement in the country’s risk ratings may ensure access to low-cost funds 
becomes easier. 
 
An additional effect of the initiative is the opportunity for open discussions involving the general public and 
extractive companies around issues including environment protection, local community development, investment 
climate improvement, corruption reduction among others. 
 
Recently the global initiative has been expanding its mandate to open new possibilities for ensuring transparency in 
the granting of licenses, contracts and beneficiary rights by providing conditions for the disclosure of incomes and 
transfers not only at the national level but also locally. The new EITI standards have set new challenges for 
members implementing the initiative, as is the case with former soviet countries, like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
that are participating.281 In these countries there is still a weak understanding within society what the process 
requires given the poorly coordinated actions of all structures involved in the EITI and low public awareness of the 
goals of the EITI. 
 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan joined the EITI 13 years ago as a pilot country. The first six years marked an important period for 
Azerbaijan’s EITI implementation and this period was characterized by the institutionalization of EITI in Azerbaijan. 
Before 2009 Azerbaijan was renowned as one of the leading EITI countries for its achievements in the 
implementation of the initiative. Although Azerbaijan successfully passed the EITI validation process in 2009, it lost 
its lead in the EITI because it did not keep up with the initiative’s improved transparency standards.282   
 
EITI Implementation in Azerbaijan can be divided into 3 phases:  
 
Phase One:  The period 2003 to 2005 can best be described as the pilot phase of EITI implementation in Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan joined the initiative as a pilot country, published the first ever EITI report of all member countries, and 
established and institutionalized the EITI in Azerbaijan. During this period, the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan 
established the Committee on EITI by its Ordinance No.224 dated 13 November 2003283; the State Oil Fund of 
Azerbaijan was selected to host the national EITI Secretariat; the NGO Coalition of Public Associations for Increasing 
Transparency in Extractive Industries was established; most of extractive companies active in Azerbaijan joined the 
initiative; and in November 2004 a Memorandum of Mutual Cooperation was signed by government, companies 
and civil society. Although the three stakeholders did not fully warm to each other at the start of this period, a 
psychological barrier was eliminated as a result of effective trilateral cooperation. Due to such cooperation, 
Azerbaijan emerged as an exemplary country for establishing the basis for EITI implementation at the international 
level. 
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Phase Two:  Between 2005 and 2009 Azerbaijan started out as an EITI candidate country and finally achieved 
compliant status. This period can be characterized as the development phase of EITI implementation in Azerbaijan. 
More than any other EITI country, Azerbaijan published the largest number of reports and gained a reputation as a 
model EITI country at the international level. On 11 September 2008 Azerbaijan tabled a resolution on the EITI at 
the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously, called for increased 
transparency and accountability in the extractive sector and encouraged international cooperation in sharing 
experiences and best practice. 
 
Phase Three: The third and current phase began on 16 February 2009 when Azerbaijan became the first compliant 
country and full member of the EITI. Although its EITI process did not undergo significant changes, Azerbaijan’s EITI 
implementation came under international scrutiny. Although the format for implementing the EITI changed with 
the creation of the Multi-stakeholder Group (MSG) and the adoption of an action plan, a period of ‘stagnation’ 
began after 2009. 
 
Once Azerbaijan had become a full EITI member, all stakeholders lost their enthusiasm to implement the EITI ideas. 
It is possible to see this period of the EITI implementation as being one of routine technical work without significant 
outcomes. Therefore one can characterize 2010 until mid-2014 as a period of stagnation.   
 
Over the last few years, the climate for civil society in Azerbaijan has deteriorated wherein the ability of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) to engage effectively in the EITI process is being seriously threatened. The crackdown on 
independent civil society has had a profoundly negative effect on the ability of CSOs and citizen activists to 
promote the EITI and open government. A number of member organizations in the CSOs Coalition on EITI were 
subjected to state sanction for a various reasons, and the bank accounts of organizations and even the personal 
accounts of senior staff were seized by court decisions adopted without the ability of NGO leaders to defend 
themselves. Furthermore, dozens of Coalition members were interrogated by the Prosecutor’s Office after criminal 
cases were opened against several local NGOs.284 As a result of such pressure, sizable numbers of independent 
NGOs working EITI issues have had to suspend their activities. Therefore, active discussion about Azerbaijani CSOs 
participation in EITI was started at the 27th EITI International Board meeting held on the 1st-2nd July 2014 in Mexico. 
 
The international civil society representatives on the EITI board stated that the country no longer abides by one of 
EITI’s key principles - ensuring free and effective participation by civil society in the process. In addition, local CSOs 
face severe restrictions on their right to exercise freedom of speech and assembly. The Azerbaijani government is 
also making it almost impossible for local civil society to access foreign funding or fulfil its basic functions with 
regards to the EITI. As a result the Board decided to send a fact finding mission to Azerbaijan. The environment for 
CSOs in Azerbaijan was assessed during a September 2014 EITI mission to Baku which gathered views on the ability 
of civil society to participate in the EITI, as well as the broader environment affecting civil society. During the 28th 
Board meeting on 14-15 October 2014 in Naypyidaw, Myanmar, the situation for civil society in Azerbaijan was 
discussed. The Board based its discussion on the report of the fact-finding mission, which found that Requirement 
1.3 (a-e)285 was not being adhered to. The EITI Board called on the government of Azerbaijan to reaffirm its 
commitment to work with civil society and ensure an enabling environment for CSO participation in the EITI. The 
EITI Board further requested that the government and the EITI multi-stakeholder group in Azerbaijan take steps to 
ensure that civil society could resume its role in the EITI process and carry out the tasks foreseen in the EITI work 
plan, including by ensuring that civil society representatives substantively involved in the EITI process are able to:  
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(i) Freely access and use funding to carry out their activities, including those of the EITI Coalition. 
Specifically, the government should ensure that the EITI Coalition and its members and employees are able 
to access their bank accounts and register new grants for the purpose of activities related to the EITI 
process and natural resource governance, and any further restrictions on NGO operations in natural 
resource governance should be avoided.  
 
(ii) Speak freely about the EITI process and express views on natural resource governance without fear or 
threat of reprisal or harassment of civil society members substantively involved in the EITI process. 
Specifically, the government should ensure that the Coalition is able to freely access space for public 
events related to the EITI and facilitate public awareness campaigns and debates related to the EITI 
process and natural resource governance.  
 
(iii) Organize training, meetings and events related to the EITI process and natural resource governance.  
 
During its 28th meeting, the Board agreed to make progress on these points, and called for early validation 
following deep concern for the ability of civil society to engage critically in the EITI process in Azerbaijan.286 The 
Board decided to assess whether Azerbaijan was in conformity with the EITI Standard, with early validation to 
commence on 1 January 2015 and be completed no later than early February 2015 for discussion by the Board at 
its next meeting287. The Board proposed a high-level mission to Baku. 
 
On 15 April 2015, Azerbaijan was downgraded to candidate country status following the reports of interference 
with and intimidation of NGOs and their staff at the EITI meeting in Brazzaville. According to the ruling, Azerbaijan 
can regain its compliant status by implementing the corrective actions requested by the EITI Board by 15 April 
2016, or face suspension or delisting from the EITI.288  
 
On 13 May 2015, the employees of the Investigation Department on Grave Crimes within the Prosecutor General’s 
Office conducted a search of the Economic Research Center (ERC)289 following a decision of the Narimanov district 
Court on 17 April 2015. As a result, all computer equipment (9 desktop computers and 1 laptop) and financial 
accounting documents (106 accounting folders) and in general up to 200 folders of documentation that pertains to 
the work of the ERC, including the EITI and the National Budget Group were confiscated. The bank account of ERC 
has been frozen since 27 June 2014. 
 
The ERC is one of the founders and most active members of the EITI Coalition. The EITI NGO Coalition considers 
that the suspension of the ERC’s bank account and seizure of the computer equipment and documentation restricts 
its activities. Thus, this action against a leading EITI Coalition member is likely to make the EITI International Board 
more critical of Azerbaijan’s current actions and more sceptical about the possible reinstatement of its complaint 
status.290 On 28 August 2015 the Prosecutor's Office decided, without further tax inspection and investigation to 
fine the ERC. 
 
On 8 October 2015 Clare Short, Chair of EITI Board, visited Baku and met with President Ilham Aliyev, the multi-
stakeholder group and members of the Coalition of Public Unions for improving transparency in the extractive 
industries in Azerbaijan.291 The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Azerbaijan’s EITI implementation. After 
meeting the President292 Claire Short stated that “The President undertook to resolve the issues raised by the EITI 
Board on civil society participation. Azerbaijan's progress on implementing this commitment will be assessed in 
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April 2016 after the publication of Azerbaijan's next EITI Report. We look forward to continue to work together 
with the government on these issues”. 
 
After the Chair’s visit to Azerbaijan, the government made efforts to improve issues that adversely affected pro-
governmental members of the NGO Coalition. Independent civil society groups still suffered from frozen 
organizational and personal bank accounts; some coalition members are enduring additional screenings at the 
borders when leaving and returning the country; some had to leave Azerbaijan and are now in exile; and some 
Coalition members are facing heavy fines for their activities.  
 
At present, access to foreign aid will have been almost impossible for over a year. The only funding source for local 
CSOs is now offered by the State Council, however this body does not have sufficient budget to support the NGO 
Coalition in its entirety.  At the beginning of last month the State Council allocated $16,500 to the Coalition. This 
amount is less than half of the amount requested by the Coalition to enable it to undertake its work. It will be the 
first time since its establishment 12 years ago that the Coalition will use state funds. This has created an even more 
challenging dynamic between the state and the coalition, particularly in terms of the increasingly adversarial public 
debate.  
 
Azerbaijan still shows an interest in continuing as a member of EITI, however there are significant obstacles. 
Currently, the government’s approach – limiting the capacity of CSOs and wider civic space - is illustrating minimal 
effort towards implementation. The next EITI Board meeting will take place in April 2016. The chances of receiving 
a positive decision at this meeting will mostly depend on the changes in the position and actions of the 
Government of Azerbaijan. 
 
Kazakhstan  
On April 14 2005 the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (RoK) formed an Interagency Working Group on 
the EITI whose task was to make recommendations for EITI implementation in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan officially 
announced it was joining the EITI process at an international conference held in Almaty 14-16 June 2005 and on 5 
October 2005, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the Interagency Working Group, 
representing the Government, and the other three parties: the RoK Parliament, foreign and domestic enterprises of 
the extractive sector and civil society representatives. The CSOs participating in the ‘Oil Revenues -Under Public 
Control’ coalition signed the Memorandum on 9 December 2005 after conducting a series of negotiations and 
developing the guidelines for the operation of the National Council of Parties Concerned (NCPC) that brings 
together government, private sector and CSO representatives. 
 
The implementation process of the EITI in Kazakhstan was the subject of validation performed by consultants Hart 
Group in 2009, after its approval by the NCPC this validation report was submitted to the EITI Board on August 11, 
2010. On the basis of this report, on 13 December 2010, the EITI Board awarded Kazakhstan with the status 
‘Candidate Country close to the status of the country conforming to the Initiative’. The Board set 12 June 2011 as 
the deadline for four corrective actions to be implemented by Kazakhstan required to achieve the compliance.293  
 
Two of these four actions were successfully completed, however there was not sufficient evidence of adequate 
compliance for the remaining two actions. On 15 February 2012 the EITI Board decided to extend the deadline for 
validation by 18 months, allowing Kazakhstan to remain a candidate country until 15 August 2013.  In 2013, 
following the validation performed by Hart, the EITI International Board concluded its assessment of Kazakhstan’s 
compliance and assigned it the status of ‘EITI Compliant Country’. 
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 The four corrective actions were that:  
1) The National Stakeholder Council should agree a clearer definition of materiality, and demonstrate that “all material oil, gas and mining payments to government” 
and “all material revenues received by governments from oil, gas and mining companies” have been covered in the 2009 report. In agreeing a definition of 
materiality, the National Stakeholder Council was encouraged to consider a specific figure that defines a material payment.  
2) The National Stakeholder Council should also clarify its agreed approach for the coverage of dividend payments and payments to local and regional authorities in 
the 2009 and subsequent reports. 
3) Increasing company participation through targeted outreach to the largest oil, gas and mining companies that are not yet part icipating in the process. An entity 
should be exempted from reporting only if it can show with a high degree of certainty that the amounts it reports would in any event be immaterial. The National 
Stakeholder Council may wish to consider requesting that the government unilaterally discloses the combined benefit stream from such small operators. 
4) The National Stakeholder Council should agree a more detailed and time-bound strategy for ensuring that company and government reports are based on audited 
accounts to international standards. 
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Civil society in Kazakhstan is under -developed, with high levels of government control or co-option and a limited 
number of truly independent organisations. The official civil society representative on the National Stakeholder 
Council is ‘Dialogue Platform’ - a coalition of NGOs - which has suffered from internal splits and a lack of cohesion, 
which has subsequently weakened its influence. Moreover, due to the sensitive nature of some of the EITI issues, 
only organisations considered to be ‘non-radical’ have tended to be invited to the table to ensure government buy-
in to the process, while donors have focused on supporting high-capacity NGOs (largely based in Almaty and 
Astana) in their efforts to build civil society capacities to deal with highly technical matters such as public finance 
analysis, resource contracts and tax management. Civil society groups from the more outlying regions (located 
closer to the extraction projects themselves) have generally been neglected.294  
 
While initially focusing on companies’ social investments, the NGO coalition has expanded its scope to the whole 
revenue management process. Since 2007, public awareness has grown along with the depth of NGO engagement 
in the EITI process. Observers have noted that although it is usually civil society groups who develop the normative 
documents for the work of the NSC, they tend to lack the required resources, experience and expertise.295  
 
At present, low cohesion among CSO alliances and a deteriorating enabling environment for independent civil 
society groups are leading to the monopolization of decision making by pro-governmental stakeholders in the 
implementation EITI in Kazakhstan. 
 
Conclusion 
An observation of recent years shows that some implementing countries no longer abide by one of the EITI key 
principles - ensuring free and effective equal participation by society in the process. Local CSOs face severe 
restrictions on their freedom of speech and the right to free assembly not only in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
Member states across the world including Ethiopia, Myanmar and Guatemala are also facing a deteriorating 
enabling environment for CSOs. Therefore, the issue of human rights and fundamental freedoms assurance 
remains on the agenda of the EITI. However, the EITI does not have effective mechanisms to ensure these values 
are respected in member countries given that the standards were not intended for this purpose. This question 
remains open for the EITI board.  
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Conclusion: Challenging times are not an excuse for being institutionally blind 
Adam Hug 
 
International institutions that saw their role following the collapse of the Soviet Union as assisting in the process of 
transition from authoritarian to open democratic societies have struggled to come to terms with the fact that, 
rather than moving forwards, in a number of states the democratic and governance environment is stagnant or 
deteriorating (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan)296 and others (Belarus, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) never really attempted to change in the first place. For all but a handful of countries 
(Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, each with notable caveats) the very language of transition is inaccurate and risks 
obscuring the consolidation of power by existing political and economic elites. Institutions that span Europe and 
Eurasia struggle with gaps in political culture. Dialogue structures designed for good faith show their limitations 
when not all parties share that goal, and sometimes try to influence the behaviour of others to undermine human 
rights commitments. While recognising the scale of the challenge ahead, with few quick wins or hope for dramatic 
short-term progress, European institutions and their participants in Eurasian bodies must hold to the long-term 
perspective that, ultimately, the Eurasian economic and security environment is enhanced by increased democracy 
and improved governance - the human dimension as set out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). These institutions must not turn a blind eye to their human rights commitments.  
 
European member and participating States need to consider how domestic narratives about the operation of 
international institutions influence the response of the non-democracies of the region. Participation has to be for 
all if, where authoritarian regimes (and the UK) are already attempting to create a la carte memberships by 
rejection of or non-compliance with key elements of some institution. The situation is most acute for the Council of 
Europe (CoE) which acts primarily as a human rights monitoring body. CoE membership loses meaning if states are 
able to reject any activity related to the promotion of human rights or the enforcement of European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings as in the case of Azerbaijan and Russia respectively.   
 
Do all the institutions noted here have the capacity or the political will to effectively meet their human rights 
obligations? At the moment the answer in a number of cases outlined by authors here is no. The outlook is fairly 
bleak as the West lacks the stomach to push hard on human rights, currently seeing its own levers of influence as 
being limited and facing many other strategic, political and economic challenges on which to spend both political 
and actual capital. Member states being more realist in their foreign policy and more national (and nationalist) in 
their political approach to international institutions will limit the scope for improving human rights in the wider 
region.  
 
There are vital pockets of expertise and independence within the international institutions of the region that need 
to be defended. This is the important work being under taken by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media, the CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
Venice Commission and in many cases the ECtHR, the lynchpins of the defence of human rights in Europe and the 
former Soviet Union (FSU). They are under political attack not only from the governments of countries in the FSU 
who they criticise but from western politicians willing to support those regimes’ narratives or who have priorities 
that do not include human rights. Those who wish to defend human rights in the region must work to push back 
against those who would silence such important critical voices. The relative success of INTERPOL and Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reforms outlined here give hope for the bureaucratic change at other 
institutions if the right mix of political pressure and technical amendments are applied. 
  
The work of the Parliamentarians, in particular at the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) and the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly would benefit from greater public scrutiny. The de-prioritising of human rights by the EU 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission do not necessarily have to be mirrored by the 
European Parliament, who should be encouraged to use their role in agreement ratification to ensure new deals 
are not passed with countries that have failed to meet their human rights commitments. 
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 One can debate whether Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan should be classified in the second and third categories respectively. The Baltic states of course have transformed 
themselves so far that, as EU member states, they are categorised differently from their former Soviet neighbours.  
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The current picture may look bleak for meaningful human rights reform in much of the FSU. However the current 
economic crisis in a number of countries (facilitated by the impact of low oil prices, sanctions, the crisis in Ukraine), 
along with the aging of leaderships in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the stagnation of longstanding elites in 
Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan for good or ill raises the prospect for sudden systemic change 
now more than perhaps at any time since the late 1990s. The renewed surge in Russian influence in the wider 
region may yet be checked by its current economic contraction. If such a radical shift was to occur in these 
countries, the institutions to which they belong could yet provide the framework to support genuine reforms. Also 
if the low oil price and economic crunch is sustained into the medium term, there is a chance that some 
governments may re-evaluate their approach to some governance reforms, as well as their desire for external 
support from donors and international bodies that condition their support on human rights and governance 
reform.  
 
In order to maintain their integrity going forwards, international institutions must not become blind to abuses 
taking place in the FSU or to efforts by those states and their Western sympathisers to close the eyes of these vital 
human rights watchdogs.  
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Recommendations 
 
To the EU and European political groups  
 The EU must ensure that revisions to operation of the Eastern Partnership policy and Central Asia strategy 
do not significantly downgrade the importance of human rights and good governance as currently implied 
by officials; 
 The EEAS and Commission should ensure that the revised progress report structure does not ignore human 
rights and governance challenges in states without an Association Agreement and DCFTA;  
 Other EU institutions, the European Parliament’s own delegations and to some extent member states, 
should fully reflect positions passed by the EP in their interactions with states in the FSU. The EP should be 
encouraged to stand by its objections to ratifying agreements with countries that have failed to meet their 
agreed human rights objectives, such as in the case of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; 
 International political groups must pay more attention to human rights abuses amongst their memberships 
and show consistency in their approach to such abuses.  
 
To national parliaments and NGOs  
 National parliaments should raise the profile and standing of the delegations they send to international 
Parliamentary Assemblies and improve the transparency around the work that they do there, such as 
recording votes they cast on the domestic parliamentary and NGO websites;  
 NGOs and parliamentary ethics bodies must continue to increase scrutiny of financial relationships 
between Parliamentarians and groups aligned to FSU governments; 
 European nations, most notably the UK, need to show greater understanding of the political impact their 
domestic criticisms of international institutions, such as the ECtHR can have on the wider region.  
 
To the Council of Europe and its members 
 The ECtHR needs to explore further opportunities to increase its capacity to further reduce its backlog of 
cases and must be resourced by member states to do so;  
 PACE needs to improve its organisational transparency, particularly when it comes to its work around 
human rights challenges, and work to improve its role in election observation so that its findings are not 
used to undermine the work of longer-term observers such as the OSCE/ODIHR. 
 
To the OSCE and its participating states 
 The OSCE must defend the role of ODIHR in providing long-term election observation, ensuing that it 
remains an assessment mechanism judging countries election practices, rather than simply becoming a 
method for information exchange;  
 OSCE participating States should strongly consider ending the OSCE budget freeze to enable it to respond 
to the increasing demands on is resources; 
 Human rights sympathetic participating States must help ensure the independence of ODIHR and the 
Representative on Freedom of Media from the consensus mechanisms that operate elsewhere in the 
OSCE; They should explore opportunities to introduce majority voting in the Permanent Council and other 
bodies to reduce political gridlock and work to improve the transparency of decision making such 
meetings;  
 They should work to oppose the downgrading of field offices and factor this into their bilateral and EU 
diplomacy.  
 
To the economic institutions  
 Regional and global development banks need to provide clearer incentives for lending that reward 
democratic development and governance reform; this is particularly true for the EBRD which retains such a 
mandate; 
 The EITI should look at ways to ensure and maintain the independence of the NGOs participating in its 
structures and improve central oversight of emerging governance problems. 
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